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FOREWORD
Sponsored by the Army Capabilities Integration Center and in collaboration with
the Joint Staff’s Deputy Directorate for Global Operations (Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment Branch), this report examines the emergence of gray zone competition and
conflict as important pacers for U.S. defense strategy. The authors argue that gray zone
challenges are unique defense-relevant issues sharing three common characteristics—
hybridity, menace to defense and military convention, and profound and paralyzing
risk-confusion.
This report and its authors offer an important opening venture into a vexing strategic question for senior defense and military leadership on the subject of gray zone
threats. Namely, how can the American defense enterprise adjust to an era of relentless
revisionist and rejectionist opposition to U.S. power? On the one hand, purposeful U.S.
competitors pursue meaningful revision of the U.S.-led status quo through campaignquality combinations of influence, intimidation, coercion, and aggression. At the same
time, rejectionist forces exploit, free-ride on, or are propelled by the generalized erosion
or outright failure of traditional political authority. Both manifest as wicked direct and
indirect threats to core U.S. interests. In virtually every case, they also occur in the uncomfortable “gray” conceptual no man’s land between classical conceptions of war and
peace.
In response to gray zone competition and conflict, this report suggests that it will be
important for U.S. defense strategists to dispense with outdated strategic assumptions
about the infallibility of U.S. global position and the rules governing the meaningful
maintenance and exercise of power. The authors suggest that the Department of Defense (DoD) should instead recognize that the U.S.-dominated status quo will encounter
persistent and unmitigated resistance. Further, the DoD should acknowledge that this
broad resistance will often take the form of gray zone competition and conflict. Finally,
the DoD should recognize that the gray zone will continue to confound the DoD until it
is normalized and more fully accounted for in defense strategy and plans.
According to the authors, the strategic antidote for gray zone challenges is a more
activist and adaptive U.S. approach in the areas of policy, strategy, plans, and capabilities. Absent innovation, in this regard, the authors suggest that the United States invites
the prospect of irreversible strategic consequences.

			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
		
U.S. Army War College Press
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
INTO THE NEW GRAY ZONE
U.S. competitors pursuing meaningful revision or rejection of the current U.S.-led
status quo are employing a host of hybrid methods to advance and secure interests
that are in many cases contrary to those of the United States. These challengers employ
unique combinations of influence, intimidation, coercion, and aggression to incrementally crowd out effective resistance, establish local or regional advantages, and manipulate risk perceptions in their favor.
So far, the United States has not come up with a coherent countervailing approach.
It is in this “gray zone”—the awkward and uncomfortable space between traditional
conceptions of war and peace—where the United States and its defense enterprise face
systemic challenges to U.S. position and authority. As a result, gray zone competition
and conflict should be pacers for defense strategy.
DESCRIBING THE GRAY ZONE
For defense and military strategists, the gray zone is a broad carrier concept for a
universe of often-dissimilar strategic challenges. Defense-relevant gray zone threats lie
between “classic” war and peace, legitimate and illegitimate motives and methods, universal and conditional norms, order and anarchy; and traditional, irregular, or unconventional means. All gray zone challenges are distinct or unique, yet nonetheless share
three common characteristics: hybridity, menace to defense/military convention, and
risk-confusion.
First, all gray zone challenges are some hybrid combination of adverse methods and
strategic effects. Second, they menace American defense and military convention because
they simply do not conform neatly to a linear spectrum of conflict or equally linear military campaign models. Finally, they are profoundly risk-confused; as such, they disrupt
strategic risk calculations by presenting a paralyzing choice between action and inaction.
The hazards associated with either choice appear to be equally high and unpalatable.
For Department of Defense (DoD) strategists and planners, gray zone competition and
conflict persistently complicate military decision-making, deployment models, and force
calculations. They often fall outside the defense conceptions of war, yet they can rapidly
and unexpectedly fall into them via miscalculation and unintended escalation. In the end,
whether emerging via purpose or implication, gray zone challenges increasingly exact
warlike consequences on the United States and its partners.
AN IMPERATIVE TO ADAPT
U.S. defense strategists and planners must dispense with outdated strategic assumptions about the United States, its global position, and the rules that govern the exercise of
contemporary power. In fact, the U.S. defense enterprise should rely on three new core
assumptions. First, the United States and the U.S.-dominated status quo will encounter persistent, unmitigated resistance. Second, that resistance will take the form of gray
xiii

zone competition and conflict. Finally, the gray zone will confound U.S. defense strategists and institutions until it is normalized and more fully accounted for by the DoD.
These assumptions, combined with the gray zone’s vexing action-inaction risk dilemma, indicate there is an urgent necessity for U.S. defense adaptation. Without it, the
United States introduces itself to enormous strategic risk. The consequences associated
with such failure to adapt range from inadvertent escalation to general war, ceding control of U.S. interests, or gradual erosion of meaningful redlines in the face of determined
competitors. These risks or losses could occur absent a declared or perceived state of
war.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Examining the gray zone challenge through the lens of five archetypes—three state
competitors (China, Russia, and Iran), one volatile environment (Middle East and North
Africa), and the United States—this study arrived at six core findings and four recommendations. The findings and recommendations are statements of principle. The study
team suggests that these principles will provide senior defense leadership with touchstones for deeper examination. The findings and recommendations are broken into two
major categories: policy and strategy, and operational plans and military capabilities.
The former provide judgments affecting high-level DoD decision-making, while the latter informs how the U.S. military might consider employing forces and assets.
POLICY AND STRATEGY
In the area of policy and strategy, this study found that there is no common perception of the nature, character, or hazard associated with the gray zone or its individual
threats and challenges. Consequently, there are gaps in strategic design, deliberate
plans, and defense capabilities as they apply to operating and succeeding in gray zone
environments. This study further found that there is significant asymmetry in risk perceptions between the United States, its partners, and their principal gray zone adversaries and competitors. The results of this apparent asymmetry of risk-perception are
predictable—loss of initiative, ceded control over interests or territory, and a position of
general disadvantage in the face of aggressive gray zone competition. Finally, this study
discovered that there is neither an animating grand strategy nor “campaign-like” charter guiding U.S. defense efforts against specific gray zone challenges. Because of this,
U.S. gray zone responses are generally overly reactive, late, and ineffective.
In response to these findings, this study recommends that the DoD develop a common, compelling, and adaptive strategic picture of the range of gray zone threats and
their associated hazards. This new perspective should adequately assess the current
gray zone landscape, the likeliest future trajectory of its constituent threats, and finally,
the prospects for sharp deviations from current trends that might trigger a fundamental defense reorientation. It further recommends that the DoD “lead up” and develop
actionable, classified strategic approaches to discrete gray zone challenges and challengers. Without a coherent approach to reasserting U.S. leadership, the United States
risks losing control over the security of its core interests and increasing constraints on
its global freedom of action.
xiv

OPERATIONAL PLANS AND MILITARY CAPABILITIES
In the area of operational plans and military capabilities, this study found that combatant commanders’ (CCDR) presumptive future gray zone responsibilities do not
align with their current authorities. Combatant commands (CCMDs) need greater flexibility to adapt to their theater strategic conditions, and must act to gain and maintain
the initiative within their areas of responsibility. It further found that the current U.S./
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) joint phasing model is inadequate to
seize and maintain the initiative in the gray zone. Purposeful gray zone revisionist
actors are successfully campaigning and achieving warlike objectives inside the steady
state or deterrence phases of the U.S./NATO joint phasing model. Further, contextual
forces of rejection are themselves accumulating warlike wins in the absence of a coherent
non-linear U.S. approach. Finally, this study concluded that current U.S. concepts for
campaign design, the employment of forces, and the use of force are not well-adapted
to persistent gray zone competition and conflict.
To contend effectively with the implications of these findings, this study recommends
the following initiatives. First, CCDRs should be empowered to “operate” against active gray zone competition and conflict with new capabilities and agile, adaptive
models for campaigning. This implies that CCDRs should possess the requisite responsibility, authority, and tools essential to achieve favorable outcomes that are in their
purview. In addition, this study found that the DoD and the Joint Force should develop
and employ new and adaptable concepts, capabilities, and organizational solutions
to confront U.S. gray zone challenges. It recommends a number of specific actions to
improve U.S. military performance in the areas of ground and special operations forces
(SOF), air and maritime capabilities, cyber capabilities, exercises, and power projection.
WAY AHEAD—ADAPTATION AND ACTIVISM
Normalizing and accounting for the DoD’s burgeoning gray zone challenge relies on
the socialization of two important concepts—adaptation and activism. The defense enterprise needs to adapt to how it sees its gray zone challenges; how it charters strategic
action against them; and, finally, how it designs, prioritizes, and undertakes that strategic action. All of these require a robust and activist DoD response. To date, the United
States favors approaches that are more conservative. This study suggests that continuing
such approaches invites substantial and potentially irreversible strategic consequences.
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Foundational
Understanding

1

I. INTRODUCTION—NO MORE BLACK OR WHITE, ONLY GRAY
“Man’s mind stretched to a new idea never goes back to its original dimensions.”
-Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. 1

A NEW THEORY OF THE DEFENSE CASE
There is a tough reality confronting Department of Defense (DoD) leaders of late.
The favorable post-Cold War status quo they and the broader national security community have largely defined, cultivated, nurtured, controlled, and come to rely on for
the past 25 years faces a fresh set of strategic-level challenges that are neither war nor
peace in their most classic definitions. They are not black or white but instead, decidedly
gray because they lie in-between. They
are between doctrinaire conceptions
Strategic Insights—No More Black or White
of war and peace, between legitimate
and illegitimate motives and methods,
• The gray zone is a broad carrier concept for a
between universal and conditional
collection of sometimes dissimilar defense-relenorms, between order and anarchy,
vant challenges—describe it, don’t define it.
and finally, between traditional and ir• Gray zone challenges lie between “classic” war
regular or unconventional means.
and peace, legitimate and illegitimate motives
Many U.S. competitors have choand methods, universal and conditional norms,
sen to operate in this space by design.
order and anarchy, and traditional and irregular
A favorable U.S.-led status quo has, to
(or unconventional) means.
date, allowed the United States and its
• All gray zone challenges have three common
partners to dictate the terms and outcharacteristics:
comes of both the “black”—open and
o Hybridity
unambiguous traditional military cono Menace to defense/military
flict—and the “white”—routine and
convention
peaceful diplomatic and economic reo Risk-confusion
lations—scenarios. In order to compete
• Each distinct gray zone challenge is a unique,
context-dependent security hazard.
most effectively, many U.S. opponents
choose to operate in between. In fact,
today the most impactful defense-relevant competition and conflict most frequently occurs in the decidedly gray territory.
This gray zone competition and conflict—lying awkwardly in an uncomfortable conceptual no man’s land for strategists and military planners—will remain a key pacer for
U.S. defense calculations well into the foreseeable future. Combating or contending with
the gray zone relies on it remaining at the center of contemporary defense dialogue.
Currently, there is no good playbook for operating effectively in the gray zone. Yet,
trends in international security and deliberate adversary activity clearly compel urgent
and sophisticated U.S. defense adaptation to its unique demands. Without adaptation,
the United States introduces itself to strategic risk at the hands of its gray zone adversaries, competitors, and competitive contextual circumstances. The sources of risk could
range from inadvertent escalation to general war, ceding control of U.S. interests, or
gradual erosion of meaningful redlines in the face of determined competitors. These
risks or losses could occur without the existence of a declared or perceived state of war.
3

While the gray zone and its emerging threats are not always or even commonly defense-specific challenges, building capability for and campaigning effectively in the gray
zone are clearly among the DoD’s most compelling near- to mid-term defense-relevant
demands. As such, designing effective responses to key gray zone challenges should
be a high-priority for U.S. strategists and decision-makers in the forthcoming defense
review. That is the focus of this study.
DESCRIBE THE GRAY ZONE; DON’T DEFINE IT
The gray zone is admittedly a broad carrier concept for a collection of sometimes dissimilar defense-relevant challenges. In this regard, statically defining the gray zone may
be far less useful to the defense strategy and policy community than simply describing
it as it is now and as it likely will be for some time. Three characteristics are common to
all gray zone challenges.
The first and most obvious characteristic is their inherent hybridity. At their core, all
gray zone challenges are a hybrid combination of adverse methods and strategic effects.
Their complexity and ambiguity militate against effective and meaningful U.S./partner
counteraction—especially those countervailing actions or responses that ruthlessly adhere to traditional U.S. conceptions of war and peace.2
The second common characteristic of all gray zone challenges is their direct, universal menace to American defense and military convention. In short, they simply do not
conform neatly to the traditionally linear spectrum of conflict nor to the equally linear
American joint military campaign model. Therefore, in a word, they are hard. For an
inherently conservative U.S. defense establishment, they are hard to classify, hard to
conceptualize, hard to plan against, and therefore, very hard to counter.
The third and final characteristic common to all gray zone challenges is their profound risk-confusion. In short, threats emerging from the gray zone have a decidedly
disruptive effect on strategic risk calculations. Often, the risk associated with action and
inaction appears to be equally high and unpalatable.
Individually, each distinct gray zone challenge is a unique, context-dependent security hazard. They manifest differently depending on strategic circumstances, the means
available to specific opponents, and the degree to which the same opponents control
outcomes overall. In short, there is no single template for gray zone challenges or challengers and, therefore, no one silver bullet to combat or counter them effectively. In the
end, it is best to describe the gray zone in terms of what it is not than what it is. It is neither the routine peaceful interactions of textbook international relations nor the equally
doctrinal challenge of major great power war. Specific challenges in it manifest as tough,
complex, and often ambiguous combinations of forces, actors, methods, and effects.
Today, for example, the gray zone includes aggressive high-stakes statecraft of the
kind exhibited by revisionist powers like Russia, China, and Iran, where rival states marshal various instruments of influence and intimidation to achieve warlike ends through
means and methods falling far short of unambiguous or open provocation and conflict.3
Rivals pursuing their interests in the gray zone in this manner do so via methods and
means that limit their exposure, avoid direct military conflict with the United States, and
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exploit their own areas of relative strength or advantage. They generate asymmetries of
decision, capability, and risk perception that can stymie effective American responses.
The gray zone also includes the less purposeful and more incidental confluence of
destabilizing, competitive forces (e.g., popular disaffection, disintegrating authority,
hyper-connectivity, distributed resistance, and proliferating lethality or disruptive potential), and the organic rejectionist movements best positioned to exploit all or some
of these forces to their decided advantage. This latter contextual combination of hostile
forces in places like the Middle East exploits clear vulnerabilities in the prevailing status
quo and presents effective hazards to core U.S. interests across a broad and seemingly
indefensible front—all from sources operating well-outside the traditional state system.
THE “NEW GRAY NORMAL”
Thus, for the near future, broad-spectrum gray zone resistance to U.S. politico-military dominance will emerge from a shifting universe of state and nonstate actors. The
“new normal” will witness anti-U.S. resistance unfolding outside the basic “rules” of
American defense and foreign policy convention. Consequential antagonists will include but will not be limited to the usual suspects. China, Russia, Iran, North Korea,
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and al Qaeda, for example, have adapted
and will complicate the defense of important American interests by maneuvering more
often than not in the gray zone. Likewise, new—and perhaps even wholly unfamiliar—
security challengers are likely to ultimately avail themselves of the ways and means of
effective gray zone resistance as well, and enter a crowded and competitive counter-U.S.
market at a surprisingly low price point.
Purposeful resistance to the American-led status quo is not new. New, however, are
the number of actors simultaneously empowered to resist U.S. influence effectively, the
variety of routes and vectors from which they can threaten harm to core U.S. interests,
and, finally, the volatility of an international system under persistent seismic pressure
from the competing forces of integration and disintegration. In recent years, these three
factors combined have coalesced into a new and novel set of national security challenges that, to date, defy the most traditional or conventional U.S./partner “challengeresponse” templates.
ABOUT THE STUDY AND FINDINGS
This study endeavors to offer the DoD useful insights on all three counts described
previously. It grew from acknowledged confusion within the defense strategy and analysis communities about what gray zone challenges are, what they are not, and what they
mean for the DoD going forward. In spite of a great deal of DoD-chartered work on the
subject, there is no common conceptual understanding of the gray zone, its theoretical
boundaries, or its specific constituent challenges. Moreover, there is no common agreement on how the U.S. defense establishment might best posture and focus to contend
with gray zone challenges and its various permutations.

5

There are three foundational research assumptions underpinning this work. First, the
United States and the U.S.-led status quo will remain under persistent assault through
the near to mid-terms from a diverse array of actors, forces, and conditions. Second, gray
zone competition and conflict will be the most common forms of counter-U.S. resistance
for the foreseeable future and will pace U.S. defense strategy over the same period. Finally, the gray zone will increasingly create “wicked” strategic planning dilemmas for
U.S. strategists until it is normalized and more fully accounted for in DoD strategy and
plans.
There are those in the defense strategy and analysis communities who consistently
argue that there is nothing new to gray zone competition and conflict. This study finds
that while there is some merit to that argument academically; practically, it is irrelevant.
The cases provided demonstrate that U.S. policymakers and military leaders have repeatedly been unprepared to counter adversaries who operate effectively in the gray
zone. This study’s intensive examination of known gray zone challenges has validated
all three assumptions.
Although the report acknowledges gray zone competition as whole-of-government
business, this is a defense-specific study. Therefore, the work limits its recommendations to the DoD or issues directly affecting the defense enterprise: U.S. Joint Forces,
and by implication, the defense and military institutions of U.S. foreign partners. This
study first attempts to effectively describe or conceptualize the strategic environment
and the trends contributing to the emergence of contemporary gray zone competition
and conflict. Second, it identifies and classifies a finite set of pacing archetypes that defense and military leaders might consider hedging against in future strategy. Finally,
in response to the aforementioned, it identifies specific findings and recommendations
relevant to effective defense responses to gray zone challenges. It concludes that the
gray zone’s inevitable persistence as an American military pacer will demand innovation across the DoD. This study examines the character of gray zone competition and
conflict in four major archetypal categories. These categories are distinct in that each
represents a unique set of gray zone conditions and circumstances that senior defense
leadership must consider when assessing the relative value of U.S. strategic priorities.
Three archetypes align with specific state actors—China, Russia, and Iran. All three have
demonstrated a deftness and athleticism in their purposeful gray zone approaches that,
to date, have outmaneuvered their seemingly less nimble U.S. competitor.
The fourth archetype is less purposeful and driven more by environmental factors.
It represents the colliding forces of revolution and reaction rending at the fabric of functioning order in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Where these forces collide
most violently, novel threats to American interests emerge. Often these threats fall well
outside the traditional frames by which the DoD establishes its future priorities. Thus,
MENA is gray less by design and more by implication.
In each case, this study finds that while the nature of consequential competition and
conflict remain largely unchanged (e.g., contest of wills between two or more sides), the
character of these important struggles has evolved and will continue to do so in ways
that presently outpace the United States’ ability to respond effectively.
In the end, this study arrived at six major findings falling in two general issue areas.
The first set of findings was in the general issue area of policy and strategy, and the
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second in the area of operational plans and military capabilities. In the first general issue
area, the study team found that there is no commonly shared defense or U.S. Government perspective on the nature, character, or hazard associated with gray zone threats. A
second finding in this general issue area was that there is a significant asymmetry in risk
perceptions between U.S. and partner decision-makers on the one hand, and adversaries
on the other. In short, it appears U.S./partner strategic leaders are more risk averse or
more risk-confused than are their gray zone competitors. A third and final finding in the
area of policy and strategy was a realization that no deliberate grand strategy or actionable strategic charters exist to guide U.S. defense efforts against gray zone challenges.
In the second general issue area of operational plans and military capabilities, the
study team made three additional findings. The first finding concerned combatant commander (CCDR) authorities. Assuming increased senior-level interest in counter-gray
zone activity, the team found that presumptive CCDR authorities and responsibilities
do not match. Additionally, a second finding identified significant weaknesses in the
current U.S./North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) construct for joint campaigning. In short, the team discovered that the current construct was inadequate for seizing and maintaining gray zone initiative. Lastly, a third finding showed that the U.S.
concepts for the design and employment of force and forces in gray zone environments
were not well-adapted to actual real-world demand.
From these findings, this study arrived at four broad recommendations for consideration by the DoD. First, the team concluded that the DoD should develop and promulgate a common, compelling, and adaptive picture of gray zone threats and their hazards.
Second, in the absence of comprehensive high-level strategic guidance, the DoD should
“lead up” and develop actionable and classified charters for specific defense and military actions to combat discrete gray zone challenges and challengers. Third, nationallevel leadership and the DoD should empower U.S. CCDRs to “operate” against active
gray zone competition and conflict with new capabilities and with agile and adaptive
campaign models. Finally, the defense enterprise should develop and employ new
and adaptable concepts, capabilities, and organizational solutions against gray zone
challenges.
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II. STUDY METHODOLOGY
In August 2015, the United States Army War College (USAWC) initiated this study
under the charter of the previous Army Chief of Staff General Raymond T. Odierno.
Subsequently, the USAWC study team received additional sponsorship and endorsement from the Commander, Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC), U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the Chief, Joint Strategic Multi-layer
Assessment Branch of the Joint Staff Deputy Directorate for Global Operations (J-39). An
integrated team of four faculty and ten student investigators conducted the work over
a period of 9 months, from September 2015 through May 2016. The project followed a
three-phase approach.
In Phase I (September - October 2015), the USAWC study team conducted a broad
literature review and a series of internal team deliberations aimed at organizing the
research effort and developing a set of preliminary insights. Phase I ended with the first
of two planned external working groups. The study’s external working group consisted
of trusted experts and stakeholders from outside of USAWC’s Strategic Studies Institute (SSI). The study team selected a working group membership because they and/or
their parent organizations represent important perspectives on the subject of gray zone
challenges.
The working group included representatives from the military services, the Joint
Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, prominent think tanks, USAWC teaching
faculty, and academia. Appendix I lists working group participants. The first external
working group assisted USAWC researchers refine their preliminary insights, shape
and scope the project’s focus, and identify priorities for future inquiry.
In Phase II (November 2015 - March 2016), the USAWC team conducted a series of
roundtable engagements and interviews with national security, defense, and foreign
policy experts currently engaged in work related to gray zone threats. Among those consulted were prominent analysts from the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), the Center
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the Institute for the Study of War (ISW),
and RAND. In addition, USAWC researchers engaged U.S. and allied military leaders,
diplomats, and intelligence professionals in a series of interviews and roundtables to
gain their insights on gray zone challenges.
Among those consulted were experts from the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM),
U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), U.S.
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), the Joint Staff, NATO Allied Command
Transformation (SAC-T), NATO Strategic Communications Center of Excellence (SCCoE), U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR), U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), U.S. Army Cyber
Command and Second Army (ARCYBER), and ARCIC.
In Phase II, the USAWC study team convened the second and final external working
group. The Phase II working group focused on refining and testing this study’s preliminary conclusions and recommendations. Further, this working group was instrumental
in identifying research gaps that this study needed to address prior to final publication.
In Phase III (March - April 2016), USAWC researchers continued with interviews and
roundtable discussions while drafting their final report. Phase III involved significant external report vetting with important stakeholders as well. During Phase III, the USAWC
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study team also convened a senior review group in order to vet this study’s findings and
recommendations prior to publication of the final report. The senior review group was
comprised of five senior leaders with broad experience in defense and military strategy
development. Senior review group members are listed in the acknowledgements.
Participation in both the external working group and/or the senior review group
does not connote endorsement of this report or its findings by either individuals or their
organizations.
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III. FRAMING THE CHALLENGE
FIRST PRINCIPLES—THE NATURE VERSUS CHARACTER OF WAR
In Book I of his celebrated treatise On War, Clausewitz defined war as “nothing but
a duel on a larger scale.”4 He also likened that duel to a wrestling match—a competition
between two parties—each vying for the upper hand, and ultimately, through the application of force, compelling the other to accept defeat.
This definition is useful in understanding how to frame gray zone challenges for
U.S. policymakers, especially if one assumes that the successful application
Strategic Insights—Framing the Challenge
of force can include an assortment of
actions, both military and non-military,
• U.S. decision-makers fail to recognize that the
that often remain beneath the threshcharacter of meaningful competition and conold of open or unambiguous conflict
flict has changed fundamentally.
or outside the preferred or classical
• This is the product of four failed assumptions:
definition of war. In applying Clauseo The United States is and will always be the
witz’s parsimonious definition to gray
“good guy.”
zone competition and conflict, this
o
Competitors will adopt, fight, and lose acstudy questions the notions that gray
cording to U.S. rules.
zone challenges are not simply acts of
o
Only conflict between large and capable
war by another name or a sanctuary for
states matters.
actions that are profoundly warlike in
o
The authority of states will remain uncontheir consequences.
tested.
If, for example, gray zone competition and conflict are actually forms of
war or replacements for war, then the
qualities that constitute war’s enduring nature apply with equal certainty to key exemplars of gray zone activity. While war’s nature may endure, its character changes
persistently. Thus, this study argues that resort to gray zone activities by purposeful adversaries, as well as U.S. involvement in the contextual and amorphous gray challenge
of collapsing authority, all represent evolutions in the character of at least some types of
war—especially as they relate in practice to DoD strategy and planning.
Viewing gray zone competition through this Clausewitzian lens could be a useful
starting point for strategy development. Likewise, it helps security professionals and
policymakers answer key questions that will undoubtedly shape future strategy. Among
those questions are the following: What is the value of the interests or objectives in play?
What are the broad strategic costs associated with pursuing or defending them? How
certain is success? What are the consequences of failure? Finally, given competing calculations on success and failure, is there sufficient will to pursue objectives in light of their
costs, and how long can that will be maintained?
While it is not the intent of this study to characterize all competitive relationships
with the United States as states of war, viewing gray zone activity within the warlike
context described here forces acknowledgement of both the unchanging nature and
changing character of consequential conflict. Failing to categorize it as such may lull
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leaders into a dangerous place where the aforementioned questions are never addressed
or are addressed much too late for desirable outcomes to remain possible.
Recognizing that the nature of war is unchanging, while persistently staying ahead
of its changing character, is a critical step in the perpetual adaptation of the American
defense enterprise to its most important future demands. Failure to comprehend the
changing character of war and conflict as they relate to the gray zone, may in fact be
what is confounding U.S. defense and security professionals so profoundly today.
Many of them are quick to argue against the gray zone’s “newness.” There may be
nothing new about it if one only considers it in the context of the unchanging nature of
war—i.e., a contest of wills. New or not, the United States and its partners appear hamstrung in every attempt to act with purpose against the most compelling challenges the
gray zone has in store.
It is clear to the study team that the circumstances and methods under and by which
modern competition and conflict occur are changing fundamentally. This trend includes
an expansion and transformation of meaningful contestants operating in the system, the
tools and methods they employ to compete, and the contexts within which they and others attack various positions and defend their own. For U.S. defense leaders, the character
of meaningful competition and conflict has changed qualitatively and quantitatively.
This change persistently catches the United States off guard and impairs its ability to
respond to and compete effectively in the contemporary environment.
There are clear reasons behind this. The study team concludes that four failed assumptions about the strategic environment are the root of the problem.
FIRST PRINCIPLES—FOUR FAILED ASSUMPTIONS
While the United States may remain first among equals in the contemporary environment, its ability to contend effectively with a number of increasingly capable competitors (state and nonstate) and contextual competitive forces is in question. Over the
last 16 years, these challenges have compounded as U.S. strategy has increasingly run
aground on the shoals of four failed strategic assumptions. All four assumptions are
intrinsically interconnected and their collective failure has had cascading impacts on the
U.S. defense outlook.
Persistent adherence to these four basic but increasingly faulty assumptions has effectively masked the onset of a yawning gray zone gap in U.S. defense strategy and
planning. As American strategists persisted in filtering strategic thinking through the
conventional wisdom of 20th-century realism, new rules or no rules were fast emerging
to define the DoD’s decision-making landscape.
Assumption 1: The United States is and will always be the good guy.
The first failed assumption long held that the U.S.-led post-Cold War status quo
would enjoy universal and perpetual approval worldwide. For three plus generations,
post-World War II international norms, institutions, and economic arrangements, as
well as the Cold War balance of power largely succeeded in regulating competition between the world’s most consequential state actors. Indeed, the latter bi-polar balance, in
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particular, dominated and moderated international security affairs for nearly 50 years.
At a minimum, that same rules-based order helped avert the global catastrophe that
would have been war between the United States and the Soviet Union.
The system experienced a disruptive perturbation in 1991 when the U.S.-led “West”
won a peaceful victory over its communist rival. Among U.S. strategists, the end of the
Cold War was widely viewed as representative of a more profound shift in international security affairs. It marked a wider triumph of liberal democracy over the alternative illiberal exercise of political authority and the presumed bellicosity that would
accompany it.
This “end of history” logic held that U.S. leadership in both the victory against communism, as well as U.S. stewardship of the post-Soviet transition, would translate into
a permanent and inviolable endorsement of an American-led post-Cold War order. It
was further assumed that U.S. leadership would be widely recognized within that order
as both a universal common good and an essential component of a stable, secure, and
prosperous international system.
The United States is now acutely aware that much of the world might have different
ideas. New centers of power and influence are fast emerging. Consequently, the world is
increasingly multi-polar and power itself is more context-dependent. Increasing multipolarity and greater access to exploitable influence and power have given rise to a new
crop of opportunistic actors who actively agitate to revise or reject the U.S.-led status
quo. In brief, the United States’ defense agenda has experienced significant horizontal
and vertical expansion as it progressed through the post-Cold War period. Moreover,
the expansion and layering of consequential competitors on that agenda has complicated DoD prioritization and planning immensely.
Assumption 2: Competitors will adopt, fight, and lose according to U.S. rules.
Yet another failed assumption held that American military dominance vis-à-vis all
possible competitors would persist indefinitely with prudent U.S. investment. This assumption relied on the U.S. brand of military superiority—with its ordered model for
campaigning, global reach, power projection, precision lethality; and superior technology, organization, and training—holding its value and remaining an unassailable competitive edge regardless of where or under what circumstances it was applied. In short,
there was a prevailing view that the “American way of war” or, more accurately, the
American preference to prepare for a particular kind of war would endure as a meaningful hedge against the most important defense-relevant threats and challenges regardless
of their origin.
American strategists have seen this assumption shattered over the last 15 years.
Exquisite organization, equipage, and training were enough to defeat a decaying Iraqi
Army and drive the Taliban from power. However, the same perceived advantages had
to undergo radical reorientation to combat shadowy insurgent armies effectively in both
instances. Likewise, U.S. direct action and precision strikes have proven ruthlessly effective in culling the terrorist population from time to time. However, they have also been
far less effective at either ending or even limiting the terrorist threat overall.
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At the higher end of the conflict spectrum, innovation on the part of China’s People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) in the area of anti-access/area denial (A2AD) capabilities already
limits U.S. freedom of action in the Pacific theater in the event of increased hostilities.
PLA A2AD capabilities provide China with a potent defensive umbrella under which it
pursues a comprehensive offensive irredentist agenda through means and methods that
include but are not limited to military activity. The Russians also aggressively pursue
regional interests in their near abroad, employing hybrid cut-outs as frontline forces
while deterring or limiting American and allied military response options through the
promise of unacceptable high-end military escalation.
Both China and Russia maneuver nimbly through the gray zone with a mixture of
capabilities and methods at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of decision and
action. They both appear to have mastered the delicate balance and modulation of influence, intimidation, coercion, and aggression; adjusting all four across competitive
domains to advance their objectives while keeping their own strategic costs and risks
within an acceptable range. In both instances, their use of military force and forces is
part of a broader “political-military-economic-information mosaic” of gray zone activities intended to generate synergy in strategic effects. To date, their approach has confounded U.S. and allied leadership.
Assumption 3: Only conflict between large and capable states matters.
A third failed assumption applies equally to the United States, its partners, and its
competitors. At work here is the lingering conceit of realist great powers unable to adapt
to 21st-century realities. This assumption held too long that the only international competition and conflict that counted involved rival great powers or rival alliances. The
international community presumed this to be an enduring and immutable foundation
for defense planning. Prepare for the “big one” (a major interstate conflict) and the presumed result will be the reduction of all risk.
According to this assumption, raw calculation of rival powers’ military, economic,
and political potential and the active employment of that potential in defense of opposing core interests would persistently govern outcomes in international affairs. Among
great powers, contesting one another’s physical, virtual, and ideological space would
largely be rules-based and orderly. Most great powers assumed that it would remain so
in perpetuity.
To the extent there was anarchy, it manifested most importantly in the divergent
interests of powerful states. Thus, weak states and nonstate movements were instruments or arenas of rival great power competition, not meaningful participants in it. In
short, the world’s most important disputes would occur between great powers, never
within or transcending them. This assumption further held that real advantages in the
classical instruments of coarse or hard power always trumped any countervailing use of
alternative, less classical, or “smarter” tools of statecraft. Finally, in this worldview, war
itself was predictable, linear, and always an escalatory extension of state policy. In this
regard, it was the last step of policy. It was neither an intermediate step nor a persistent
state of being.
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This assumption also crashed violently into the reality of prolific discontent, profound rejection, and hyper-connectivity. Increasingly, where there was a will there
would be a way for less overtly powerful states and nonstate movements and actors to
be heard and felt. Thus, over the last decade and a half, more states have entered into
meaningful competition with the United States. Additionally, an increasing number of
consequential nonstate actors, movements, and proto-states have emerged in relatively
rapid order to exercise state-like influence over the course of important international security issues. In some contexts, nonstate forces and movements replaced states or competed with states as peers. In others, they aligned with states as equals or acted as proxy
instruments of states bent on advancing their interests without a sizeable commitment
of their own human and material resources.
The U.S. national security community has long recognized the rising impact of nonstate actors. What is new, however, is the ability of some of them to marshal sufficient
capability—often over great distances in a highly distributed manner—to compete effectively with states and other state-like movements as a peer-, near-peer, or consequential
spoiler.
U.S. defense strategists ignore the rise of extra-state power at their peril. Unfortunately, the default Pentagon position addresses each new nonstate challenge as it arises—e.g., al Qaeda begets the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), etc. Instead, it
would be useful for the DoD to recognize the real prospect of wholesale atomization and
democratization of effective counter-U.S. resistance.
Assumption 4: The authority of states will remain uncontested.
The fourth and final failed assumption is a corollary to Assumption 3. It too is not
unique to the United States or its partners. It is also rooted in classical realism and is yet
another example of a naïve conceit among ruling political elites worldwide.
This assumption held that states would forever be perceived en masse as the only
legitimate and effective instruments of identity formation, political authority, and arbitration, or meaningful collective action. According to this view, states were indivisible,
rational, and unitary actors. If, as argued, the only meaningful international activity
occurs between powerful states or groups of powerful states, then—within states—governments would logically be the only legitimate mechanism for maintaining a monopoly
on violence, exercising political authority, and cultivating animating identity, political
affiliation, and loyalty. Nonstates inclined to compete in this regard were perceived as
pretenders.
The 21st-century reality is quite different. Today, all states are experiencing a precipitous decline in their authority, influence, reach, and common attraction. Increasingly,
states compete across thick webs of hyper-connected discontent with myriad alternative
sources of political alignment or allegiance. When states outwardly appear to be weak or
failing, this trend is more pronounced. However, the fraying or disintegration of formal
political authority is not solely the concern of weak or failing states.
The increasing chasm between governments and their governed over the basic right
to rule is likely to extend beyond the most vulnerable usual suspects. Fueled by prolific
electronic connectivity and access to information, this general trend will continue to tear
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at the connective tissue holding more capable and powerful states intact as well. Even
powerful states now all wrestle with one another over competing interests while standing on quicksand—threatened simultaneously by capable state and nonstate rivals, as
well as the fragile and restive social order they themselves rest on.
The devolution of traditional political authority has three profound defense-relevant
impacts on gray zone challenges. First, purposeful gray zone challengers will encourage, foment, and exploit it in order to create favorable operating conditions for themselves. This will occur in spite of the fact that they too are vulnerable to the 21st century’s
disintegrative forces. Second, states and regions in or on the brink of serious civil unrest
or vulnerable to cross-border political contagion are likely ripe for proxy confrontations
between gray zone opponents. Finally, abrupt loss of effective political authority in important regions and states, and the sub-national and transnational rivalries emerging
from it, create complex contextual gray zone challenges that can inevitably pose unpredictable, often escalatory hazards to core U.S. interests.

16

IV. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT – THREE ALTERNATIVE ASSUMPTIONS
A VOLATILE, UNCERTAIN, COMPLEX, AND AMBIGUOUS (VUCA)
LANDSCAPE
A recent RAND report described the United States as tired of costly military intervention, politically polarized, and still recovering from a devastating years-long economic
recession.5 In short, an activist U.S. foreign and security policy is seen as burdensome by
many—including the political and military decision-making class—in light of a difficult
decade and a half of persistent conflict. This is a common perception. Yet, the United
States is Janus-faced in this regard.
To be sure, there are explicit calls
Strategic Insights—Strategic Environment
to look inward, reduce military spend• The current security environment is dominated
ing, protect the U.S. economy, and seby change.
cure the prosperity and well-being of
• The United States no longer enjoys an exclusive
American citizens at home first. At the
hold on game-changing international influence.
same time, there are equally adamant
calls for the United States to maintain
• Three new assumptions should animate future
U.S. defense policy:
its central and indispensable role in
global leadership, preserve its military
o The United States will remain under persisdominance across five critical joint dotent assault from a diverse array of actors,
forces, and conditions (revisionist and rejecmains, and secure an expansive and
tionist).
demanding set of national security
and military objectives worldwide.6 To
o Gray zone competition and conflict will be
the most common forms of counter-U.S. remake this effort even more challengsistance and should pace defense strategy.
ing, the U.S. military is called to meet
these objectives in a globally connected
o The gray zone will increasingly create wicked
and real-time responsive information
strategic planning dilemmas for U.S. strategists until it is normalized.
environment that connects all five domains. In the end, senior DoD leadership will have to rationalize policies
and prioritize efforts in the midst of these competing national demands. The essence
of effective strategy is to make the best risk-based decisions in the face of choices that
appear to be equally compelling.7
Regardless of the domestic political balance of power after 2016, the Pentagon can
anticipate that:
• It will be asked to secure U.S. interests against myriad sources of threat and
hostility;
• It will have to persistently balance risk between multiple competing and compelling military demands;
• The means available to secure interests and buy down risk will be more finite;
and finally,
• It will never be wholly ready for its next major challenge.
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All of these combined mean that the DoD now and into the future will need to
find innovative ways to fulfill its mission and persistently adapt to changing security
conditions.
Most official defense-relevant strategic assessments characterize the current security
environment as one dominated by change.8 Some change will be gradual. Some change
will be rapid. However, if major trend lines are correct, virtually all change will be both
fundamental and profoundly disruptive to the post-World War II/post-Cold War international order over time.9
Among the most impactful sources of change are major trends in globalization, the
diffusion of technology, shifting demographics, and the near certainty that power and
its meaningful exercise will no longer rest solely in the hands of either the United States
or its partners or, for that matter, states and state-based institutions alone. All of these
trends engender significant implications for the DoD and its leadership. In addition, the
last one—the fungible and shifting nature of power—should have the most immediate effect on how the DoD thinks about its contingency and threat futures. As such, it
should have profound effects on the shape and employment of the military.
Ultimately, the United States will need to make choices about shaping or reacting
to the most threatening or disruptive among these major trends. Challengers to U.S.
leadership, adherents to the U.S.-led international order, and the United States itself will
at times exploit trends to their advantage. Indeed, there is already a conscious competition for the high ground in this regard. On the other hand, many of the most disruptive
trends are simply part of the new and ever-evolving contextual mosaic within which all
states and peoples live, operate, adapt, thrive, or wither. These are among the most difficult to shape; thriving against them hinges on resiliency and adaptability in the face of
an environment that the U.S. defense establishment commonly characterizes as volatile,
uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA).10
This study suggests all four VUCA characterizations are accurate reflections of the
DoD’s decision-making landscape. Volatility will occur from the pace and scale of future
change. Uncertainty will emerge from where, when, and how major change materializes and the level of disruption involved when it does. Complexity will spring from
the myriad sources of change and their tangled, sometimes obscure, connection to one
another. And, finally, opacity about the causality of specific important events, as well as
the motives, intentions, and methods of an expanding universe of influential actors will
fuel increased ambiguity.
What is certain is perhaps equal or more important to U.S. strategic calculations than
what is uncertain. What is clear is the simple fact that the United States no longer enjoys
an exclusive hold on game-changing international influence. Its 25-year dominance of
the global agenda, its unfettered political and military freedom of maneuver, and its unchallenged reliability as the principal guarantor of the most important security outcomes
are persistently under siege from a new class of threats, competitors, and competitive
forces. These conditions imply significant adjustment by the DoD is in the offing.
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AN ESSENTIAL DEFENSE REORIENTATION: THREE ALTERNATIVE
ASSUMPTIONS
DoD leaders can make some clear alternative assumptions about their future decision-making and operating environments. These should replace any lingering adherence to the aforementioned failed assumptions. This study offers U.S. defense strategists
three new ideas to animate future defense policy and strategy development.
First, the United States and the U.S.-led status quo will remain under persistent assault for the foreseeable future from a diverse array of actors, forces, and conditions. Second, gray zone competition and conflict will be the most common forms of counter-U.S.
resistance and will pace U.S. defense strategy over the same period. Finally, third, the
gray zone will increasingly create wicked strategic planning dilemmas for U.S. strategists until it is normalized and more fully accounted for in DoD strategy and plans.
The study team initiated its work with some form of these in mind and adjusted
them throughout its research effort. In the team’s view, these three assumptions best
capture the dynamics of the fluid, complex, conflict-ridden environment the DoD will
increasingly be required to commit resources against. Further, they reflect the previous
four failed assumptions to effectively guide U.S. defense strategy and policy. They also
appropriately represent and account for new strategic conditions. Finally, they suggest
a preliminary direction for near-term defense adaptation. Translation of these and their
implications into concrete defense initiatives will be important for the DoD as it transitions into the next decade.
Alternative Assumption 1: The U.S.-led status quo will remain under persistent assault from a diverse array of actors, forces, and conditions.
As suggested, the United States and its defense establishment face a new class of
meaningful competition. Far from a stable and uncontested U.S.-led international order,
three competing types of actors vie for primacy in the contemporary security environment—status quo, revisionist, and rejectionist. Status quo actors are perceived to benefit
from and are seen as actively defending the current international system’s extant distribution of influence and authority. In brief, status quo actors value the current order and
actively work to secure it to their advantage. The United States and its major allies and
partners largely constitute the contemporary status quo.11
Revisionists are similar in stature to status quo actors. They are states that value a
rules-based order but not necessarily in its current form. Thus, the revisionists oppose
or resist the U.S.-led status quo and possess the requisite influence and means necessary
to threaten or compel a renegotiation of it on terms more favorable to them. Obviously,
any forced renegotiation of the current international order that advantages the revisionists would occur at the expense of the United States and its closest partners. In short,
revisionists advocate and agitate for a more favorable redistribution of influence and
authority in the U.S.-led order and demonstrate a willingness to act with purpose and
volition to achieve it.
Opportunistic rivals like China, Russia, and Iran are exemplars of revisionist behavior. They all pursue systemic change on a local, regional, or global basis to their decided
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advantage. In so doing, they frequently conflict with and actively undermine core U.S.
and partner interests.
All open source military assessments acknowledge Russia and Iran as potential military threats.12 In most cases, official language associated with China is more guarded
and political, with the term “competitor” being the most common characterization.13 In
light of this, all three are acutely aware of the hazards and costs associated with inadvertent escalation. In this regard, the prospect of catastrophic miscalculation casts a persistent shadow over the relationship between them and the United States. Consequently,
all three are keen and endeavor to achieve favorable outcomes through methods that
remain well below the threshold of unambiguous provocation. They are more prone to
gradually or progressively breach U.S. redlines via subtlety, ambiguity, or misdirection.
This approach works precisely because of the existing U.S. framework for great power competition. Because revisionists are large and capable states, U.S. decision-makers
commonly default to a comfortable form of rules-based 20th-century realism to guide
American responses to them. Simply put, the United States is playing by a rulebook
for the game it wants to play, while revisionist actors are playing a different game altogether. The game metaphor illustrates how failing to recognize and adapt to the everchanging character of war and consequential competition creates problems for strategists and policymakers. Fundamentally, the U.S. approach has proven faulty. Moreover,
until U.S. decision-makers begin playing the right game, American responses are likely
to continue to fall short.
The term rejectionist speaks for itself. As the term implies, these actors reject the
veracity and utility of the current U.S.-led international order, as well as its distribution
of power and authority. They are largely destroyers, not builders. In short, rejectionists
seek to discard the extant international order altogether.
They self-identify as profoundly aggrieved, denied, or disenfranchised. Rejectionists
are keen to confront what they perceive to be the unfair and illegitimate exercise of status quo political authority and they are loath to accept a new, revisionist-led status quo
that might also profit at their expense. As such, they reside and operate predominantly
beneath, adjacent to, in direct competition with, or beyond the reach of state actors. They
persistently militate against state authority and create or thrive in generalized disorder.
In the current environment, where power is becoming more context-dependent, rejectionist actors are able to wield more influence than was previously possible. In the
past, these actors could not afford to compete with or significantly alter the status quo.
The price of entry associated with sparring with state competitors on equal or somewhat
advantaged terms was simply too high. Now, the confluence of hyper-connectivity,
fraying state authority, widespread popular disaffection, organic resistance to the status
quo, distributed activism, and a real proliferation of lethal and disruptive potential provide unprecedented opportunities for rejectionists to pursue their objectives.14
Today, the most fragile quarters of the state system may be most vulnerable to rejectionist actors and movements. Yet, no one is immune from their destructive discontent. The very forces that enable rejectionists to thrive are also, by definition, those that
are progressively eroding traditional state authority, expanding vulnerabilities in the
contemporary environment, and exposing even more space that might be ripe for their
exploitation.15
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Cyberspace, for example, provides rejectionists (and revisionists) unprecedented
opportunities for mischief. The cyber domain allows rejectionists to recruit or connect
like-minded communities, indoctrinate adherents, mobilize distributed resistance and
activism, and fight untethered from the limitations of geography and distance.16 The
apparent devolution of the greater Middle East and the proliferation of a wide universe
of violent extremist organizations (VEO) are clear harbingers of rejectionist trends. The
formless, multi-sided civil conflict in the northern Persian Gulf and Levant, as well as
ISIL’s out of area agitation, are prominent artifacts of the rejectionist strain.
Since 9/11 and the post-invasion collapse of the Iraqi state and society, the disruptive potential of stateless rejectionists has been obvious to U.S. decision-makers. More
troubling, the most recent strain of VEO activity (e.g., Paris, Santa Monica, Sinai, Istanbul, Brussels, etc.) has demonstrated the effortless portability of rejectionism from a
regional to a global threat.17 Ultimately, rejectionist forces will not remain confined to
or only emerge from the Middle East as long as the thick webs of network connectivity
that both unite and divide traditional social constructions (e.g., community, region, and
nation-state) continue to metastasize.
Alternative Assumption 2: Gray zone competition and conflict will be the most common forms of counter-U.S. resistance and will pace U.S. defense strategy,
concepts, and capabilities.
Revisionists and rejectionists operating inside the gray zone will have profound implications for the DoD. Some will operate with specific counter-U.S. intent. Others will
threaten core U.S. interests and counter U.S. position by implication.
All purposeful gray zone challengers recognize U.S. strength but perceive the comprehensive or universal applicability of that strength to be eroding.18 Thus, they attempt
to pursue interests and objectives in a manner that is virtually always provocative on
some level but avoids direct military confrontation or conflict whenever possible. Most
often these actors employ means and methods that exploit their own areas of relative
strength or advantage (e.g., proximity, political ambiguity, ethno-sectarian dominance,
etc.), while purposefully targeting a known or emerging U.S. or partner weakness.
At the state level, for example, gray zone revisionists are prone to engage in aggressive competition that occurs neither wholly in the benign, often mutually beneficial,
realm of routine international relations nor in that of open warfare by any classic definition. Further, regardless of whether or not gray zone competition is viewed as war
by either side, it will inevitably have a strong military component and will have major
warlike implications and outcomes for all parties involved.
The military implications of gray zone competition are hybrid in nature. It can take
on a dangerously high-end form, especially in the case of large, capable revisionist gray
zone state actors. For example, the development and positioning of ballistic missiles,
sophisticated A2AD capabilities, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and emerging
threats to space assets and cyber infrastructure have the potential to drive significant
defense initiatives to counter these sophisticated and highly technical capabilities.
Likewise, it can occur in the muddier terrain of unconventional or irregular conflict
through cultivation and employment by adversaries of terrorism, insurgency, covert
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activities, and subversion. Both revisionists and rejectionists will likely create symbiotic
combinations of hostile or violent methods with alternative softer tools of influence,
intimidation, and coercion. Each one of these threat capabilities alone poses a significant
challenge to American freedom of action. The possibility of their combined employment
as part of a hybrid campaign creates strategic and operational dilemmas that are difficult
to ignore. Indeed, their combined employment in active campaign-quality competition
or conflict presents U.S. decision-makers with complex and multi-layered risk choices.
Gray zone challenges always create fundamental asymmetries in risk perceptions.
For American strategists, each counter-option—whether or not it occurs below the
threshold of active hostilities or in the course of open warfare—is perceived at the highest levels of decision-making to engender high risks. The threatened employment of a
sophisticated opponent’s A2AD capabilities, for example, hazards human and material
costs that are difficult to either comprehend or accept—not to mention their effectiveness in disrupting American power projection into critical regions of the world. The
perception of irrevocable costs in high-end military interventions against a capable but
still objectively weaker state adversary are likely to dissuade even the most hawkish
senior decision-makers from taking justifiable but also provocative action well prior to
open hostilities. That widely recognized hesitation opens broad avenues for maneuver
in the coercive space short of war.
Gray zone opponents can perceive inaction or ineffective action in response to them
as an open door for stronger and more assertive follow-on actions. For example, a sophisticated gray zone actor may be prone to pursue its interests via proxies and cutouts—all under the shadow of its own significant military capabilities—in order to drive
up U.S./allied risk calculations.19 In other instances, where sovereignty is disputed, the
gray zone actor can first employ policy and non-military instruments of coercion to stake
claims and crowd out weaker competition.20 When these actions go unanswered with
firm countervailing responses, the gray zone actor solidifies and fortifies their position
with military capability.
Ambiguity about causality, motives, and intentions leave room for risk-conscious
policymakers to demur in the face of gray zone provocation. This combined with hypersensitivity toward the hazards of escalation and the secondary or tertiary effects that
may come from response to gray zone activism can retard effective counteraction and,
by implication, greenlight greater assertiveness by purposeful competitors.
In the event that open and violent conflict becomes unavoidable with either revisionists or rejectionists, it is more likely than not to unfold in ways that are inconsistent
with the traditional rules and biases favored by the Pentagon. Instead, as suggested
previously, it will manifest in post-modern and hybrid combinations of methods and
capabilities, borrowing liberally from those of the conventional, unconventional, political, and criminal.21
These future hybrid wars promise cocktail-like effects as U.S. adversaries limit their
exposure; impose costs across dimensions, domains, and functions; and create wicked
challenges for the United States.22 Without significant military adaptation in response,
American forces may find themselves conceptually outmaneuvered by innovative hybrid opponents. Thus, like the carrier category of gray zone competition and conflict,
hybrid warfare will persistently evolve and stretch the conceptual boundaries of war
and peace as Washington currently understands them.
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Alternative Assumption 3: The gray zone will increasingly create wicked strategic
planning dilemmas for U.S. strategists until it is normalized and more fully
accounted for in DoD strategy and plans.
The new class of high priority gray zone problems are all wicked by definition.23 They
will increasingly manifest in less traditional, more hybrid versions of war and violent
conflict, as well as in forms of aggressive statecraft. These forms will feature comprehensive employment by adversaries of compounding methods and means that are short on
violence while long on hostility, hostile intent, and the long shadow of prohibitive cost.
In this environment, one thing is clear: the U.S.-led status quo is under attack by purpose
and happenstance from a complex array of forces. Moreover, without careful consideration and deliberate counteraction, the resulting torque on the American-led status quo
may fatally jeopardize the U.S. position.
Collectively, gray zone challenges and challengers have no common origin, locus,
antagonist, or solutions against which a parsimonious set of priorities might guide DoDlevel strategic concepts, doctrine, plans, and capabilities in response. Further, both action and inaction to counter any specific manifestation of new-age gray zone competition and conflict appear to engender significant risk.
As discussed in the opening, the gray zone is gray because it lies between what are
increasingly artificial but nonetheless widely acknowledged poles in American strategic
culture. On the one hand, there is the artificial state of peace and its associated benign
interactions between state actors. Peace in this regard is the idyllic routine of (international) community life. As each actor in the community (in particular, the United States)
seeks to advantage itself, its behavior neither occurs nor is perceived to be occurring at
the expense of others.
On the other hand, the equally artificial state of war is the unambiguous opposite of
peace. Hostility is open and explicit. There are clearly differentiated sides with equally
differentiated positions. Right and wrong are apparent as well, and therefore, there are
obvious offenders that prey on those that are undeniably offended. According to its collective self-image, there is no doubt where the United States believes it lies in any aspect
of this construction. In addition, it is difficult for the United States to believe that others—especially those it perceives to be responsible nation-states—hold a different view.
In reality, neither condition should exist as exclusive pacers for American strategists. The DoD responsibility to prevail in a high-end military confrontation remains
unchanged. Today, however, the United States is rarely at either war or peace by their
classical definitions. Instead, adversaries and competitors purposefully and persistently
campaign against it in the conceptual area lying between them. This occurs at the hands
of an identifiable set of important revisionist actors bent on either supplanting or limiting American influence in critical regions of the world. Likewise, the United States is
actively combatting violent rejectionist forces whose object is often less immediately the
United States, but instead, the order that allows the United States to both exercise and
extend its reach with impunity and to buttress the traditional authority structures that
rejectionists find illegitimate and unacceptable.
What these challenges share is the volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity that U.S. policymakers are quick to acknowledge in the abstract but loath to account
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for meaningfully in strategy and policy. While the separate struggles against revisionist
and rejectionist forces may have a common home in-between, they are confounding to
the defense enterprise because they are so profoundly different in practice. To contemporary decision-makers, risk assessment, strategy, and risk mitigation in the gray zone
appear at first to lie on a veritable “parade of horribles”—where the results of U.S. activism in the face of gray zone threats can only land along a spectrum of adverse outcomes.
Acting against purposeful gray zone actors with the military instrument—with force
and forces, for example—hazards escalation to general war. In at least two cases of realworld gray zone revisionist threats, this equates to general war with a nuclear power,—
a prospect U.S. strategists have spent very little time contemplating since 1991. Against
rejectionist actors finding sanctuary in disorder, the abject indeterminacy of the utility and projected outcomes associated with intervention are enough to trigger inaction
or half-measures instead of well-conceived commitment. In virtually every instance of
meaningful gray zone threat, profound uncertainty about what deliberate counteraction might mean for the nature, scale, and complexity of the problem over time deters
meaningful action.
Failure to respond effectively to gray zone provocations is itself a high-risk proposition. Inaction or half-measures likely embolden revisionists and rejectionists while
weakening the U.S. grip on status quo norms. This enables gray zone actors to pursue
and achieve their aims without obstacles or tangible repercussions. In addition, it likely
encourages new actors to enter the counter-U.S. market at persistently lower costs. With
the barriers to entry collapsing and more diverse and empowered actors entering the
counter-U.S. market, the DoD’s decision-making landscape will become fundamentally
more challenging.
As the DoD contemplates its expanding gray zone problem, it should view its choices
through a risk-based prism. That risk structure should balance the security of core interests against the cost associated with willfully compromising them to avoid uncertain
hazards. This study explores this idea in the following section.
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V. RISK-INFORMED APPROACH TO ASSESSING GRAY ZONE CHALLENGES
A WAY TO THINK ABOUT RISK
Strategy development identifies core objectives and the principal obstacles that exist to securing them. It charters an approach to meeting and safeguarding those objectives over time. Strategy then prioritizes the allocation and distribution of resources to
achieve these objectives. Finally, all strategy requires stress testing. After all, even the
most exquisite plans engender hazards. Therefore, identification of the vulnerabilities
exposed by a chosen strategy’s interactions with prospective rivals and rival circumstances requires thorough and deliberate risk assessment. Thus, a final essential component of strategy development always involves calculated risk mitigation.
All risk assessment involves informed judgments on the likelihood and consequences of failure that are associated with a strategy or some component of it. Risk arrives
via manifest vectors. There is, for example, ample room to misjudge the character of
principal threats, the extent of one’s own limitations, or the scope and scale of the environment’s most challenging obstacles to mission accomplishment.
Further, objectives may be unrealistic and therefore unachievable. The
Strategic Insights—Risk
strategic approach adopted to secure
•
Gray
zone
competition and conflict are inherentobjectives may be wrong, and the rely high-risk propositions for the United States
sources available to execute the stratand its partners.
egy may be insufficient, inappropri• Gray zone risk is the likelihood that the DoD
ate, or poorly focused. Each by itself
has inadequately anticipated demands and as
constitutes a potential single point of
a result, hazards failure or drastic underperforfailure and, therefore, a decisive point
mance.
for thorough risk assessment by senior
• Gray zone challenges put the United States on
leadership. Thus, there is no substitute
the “horns of dilemma”—risks associated with
or shortcut for risk assessment in strataction and inaction appear to be equally high
egy development and implementation.
and unpalatable.
This report proceeds from that
foundational belief. Therefore, the
findings and recommendations outlined herein are risk-informed. This study begins
from the hypothesis that gray zone competition and conflict are inherently high-risk
propositions for the United States and its partners. The research ultimately validated
that assumption.
By and large, the character and extent of the strategic-level risks associated with gray
zone competition and conflict spring from the complex interaction between core U.S.
interests, the VUCA environment within which those interests are in play, and the hostile actors and adverse forces most likely to thrive and compete with the United States
for primacy. Therefore, an explicit goal of this report is to aid senior DoD leadership in
effectively navigating through the inherently high-risk gray operating space to arrive at
the best strategic courses of action.
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GRAY ZONE RISK DEFINED
Risk enjoys various interpretations. Common to all, however, is the symbiotic relationship between the likelihood of some adverse outcome and the consequences of its
possible emergence. From there, alternative perspectives on risk emerge from differences in context, discipline, and issue or function. In mathematics, risk is the likelihood
of an undesirable event—often a quantitative expression between 0 and 100 percent.24 In
engineering, risk is the “mean time between failure.”25 Engineers acknowledge inherent
imperfection in their designs and they strive to delay failure while persistently identifying and incorporating alerts that might signal the onset of catastrophe.
No one can predict perfectly how the vagaries of economics will affect business outcomes. However, those responsible for gauging financial risk for corporations, shareholders, and customers do believe they can sift through an infinite number of important
variables and identify an accurate confidence interval of possible economic results. Understanding this bounded range of outcomes—with their upper and lower limits—is
invaluable to the process of allocating finite resources in pursuit of desired outcomes. In
the process of prioritizing investments and allocating resources against them, the likelihood that investments will underperform and, thus, push real outcomes downward is a
significant component of financial risk assessment.
These various interpretations inform this study’s approach to risk. However, it does
not dwell on nor draw principal inspiration from the quantitative aspects of risk assessment. For its risk lens, the study team adopted a leaner and more qualitative approach
to assess U.S./partner strategy vis-à-vis the various gray zone actors and archetypes
considered. The study team concluded that risk was the likelihood that existing U.S.
strategy, strategic approaches, and military concepts and capabilities have inadequately
anticipated future gray zone demands and, therefore, have increased prospects for either drastic underperformance or outright failure.
For example, purposeful actors who oppose U.S./partner objectives may seek to challenge elements of the American strategy employed to secure them. They may judge key
elements of the strategy to be under-defined, under-resourced, under-considered, unrehearsed, or untested and, therefore, vulnerable to exploitation. Even limited adversary
success might embolden them to future escalation. Further, success by one purposeful
actor may lead to more frequent testing by others who seek to mimic or replicate success
within their own spheres of influence and interest.
If U.S./partner strategy exhibits exploitable weaknesses or if resolve to act on them
proves vulnerable in practice, visible setbacks are likely to accrue. The frequency and
intensity of probing by adversaries and competitors, for example, may accelerate with
subsequent U.S. failures against them. In short, once a strategic course of action or its
implementation fail or are demonstrably failing, adversaries will exploit their weakest
elements. Consequently, the likelihood of future failure will rise dramatically. The study
team perceives this to be the case with respect to the United States and its current approach to gray zone competition and conflict.
This report looks at the U.S./partner gray zone risk challenge holistically, acknowledging that this potential for failure is seeded into each stage of strategy development
and implementation. As argued previously, the team’s interpretation of risk focuses on
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two key lines of inquiry and the prospect for misjudging the risks associated with them.
Again, adverse outcomes can emerge from actions undertaken and actions deferred.
Each risk vector—action and inaction—is anchored in the accepted conceptions of risk
described earlier.
THE HORNS OF A STRATEGIC DILEMMA: RISK OF INACTION VERSUS RISK
OF ACTION
Gray zone challenges grip U.S. and partner decision-making and persistently put
strategy development and implementation squarely on the horns of a seemingly intractable dilemma. In some instances, senior U.S. and allied leaders perceive that active and
assertive responses to gray zone competition and conflict hazard undesirable escalation,
excessive cost; and uncertain, indeterminate, or unfavorable outcomes. Thus, they perceive an inherent “risk of action.”
On the other hand, marginal, ineffectual, or non-existent responses to gray zone challenges can engender the opposite—some significant “risk of inaction.” Here choosing
not to act—likely because of the perceived risks engendered—leads to equally unpalatable outcomes. The United States, for example, potentially vacates or leaves vulnerable
core interests to the predations of hostile forces; U.S. decision-makers hoping but not
knowing for sure whether opponents will seize on the opportunities inaction presents.
In this regard, gray zone competition and conflict may represent the most uncomfortable and vexing decision space possible for U.S. leadership. Senior defense leaders
cannot determine which course of action holds greater advantage and, in the process,
they surrender initiative to competitors and adversaries. In the gray zone, the risks associated with action and those of inaction appear to be or are in fact, equally high.
Paralysis results and the space for adversary maneuver opens. This study concludes
that this idea is a principal distinguishing characteristic of virtually all gray zone challenges. Thus, at face value, senior defense leaders are often left with a “damned if you
do, damned if you don’t” proposition where no obvious advantages appear to exist for
any single response course of action.
Of the two vectors, risk of action is the most poignant, operative, and scrutinized.
It is the principal hazard that might accompany classic errors of commission. The costbenefit calculation associated with risk of action may generally be clearer and the potential costs of miscalculation are often immediately higher.
In short, calculation of the risk of action involves some judgment on the likelihood
that a chosen strategic course is in fact a misstep or mistake that will make matters
worse, weaken or disadvantage U.S. position, or dramatically increase risk to U.S. interests. Risk of action includes the prospect for errors of analysis or judgment that trigger
costly strategic-level action against a security challenge that is profoundly misunderstood, mischaracterized, or—in reality—non-existent. Further, it includes both risk considerations of taking any action at all, as well as those associated with taking particular
types of action.
In addition to the immediate political, human, material, and financial costs, a prominent hazard stemming from failed or marginally effective action is the very open demonstration of U.S. limitations and vulnerabilities. Somalia (1992), Iraq (2003), and Libya
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(2012), are often cited as examples of military action that did not achieve desired results,
incurred unanticipated strategic costs, and arguably worsened the existing security situation.26
Risk of inaction also involves fundamental miscalculation. It is the mirror image of,
and has a symbiotic relationship with, the former. It is the family of hazards that would
emerge from classic errors of omission, where overt and veiled but quite real challenges
are incorrectly identified as low or no threat. Like risk of action, those of inaction emerge
from a misunderstanding and mischaracterization of the environment and its challenges.
In the case of risks of inaction, however, senior leaders miss the immediacy, significance,
or impact of purposeful or contextual defense-relevant conditions. Creeping, indirect,
peripheral, or ambiguous threats fail to animate action in time to avoid disruptive or
destabilizing events.
In addition to a desire to avoid the menu of hazards associated with the risk of action, two prominent motivations for inaction are important in risk calculations. First,
inaction may stem from a desire to wait things out. This is principally a combined judgment about time, resources, and objectives—i.e., there is no immediate hazard, we have
time before it becomes one, and it’s likely we will have everything we need if the need
for a response becomes unavoidable. In the meantime, the logic holds that it is more
likely than not that the conditions of concern will subside, remain tolerable, or resolve
themselves well prior to intervention becoming necessary.
The second motive concerns escalation and the desire to avoid it. This logic holds
that all disputes short of overt attack can be resolved without taking more aggressive or
assertive action. A common argument against more assertive action against revisionist
powers like China and Russia, for example, is avoiding undesirable or dangerous escalation.27 Ultimately, this argument proceeds from the belief that status quo norms will
prevail if given a chance. Moreover, that a more aggressive attempt to moderate gray
zone activism will end in unwanted and costly escalation that cannot possibly benefit
the United States or its partners. The study team perceives both motives to be dominant
considerations in contemporary U.S. gray zone risk calculations.
Ultimately, effective calculation of the risks of inaction requires new sensitivity to the
significance of seemingly unconnected or benign events, the risk- and pain-tolerance of
adversaries, as well as a new appreciation for the speed, scale, and scope of change in
the international system and its distribution of power and influence. Further, persistent
appraisal of the real prospects for escalation vis-à-vis purposeful revisionist state actors
is in order as well. In reality, the U.S. threshold for defining threats—particularly those
in the gray zone—will need to be recalibrated, as our protocols for identifying hazards
and hazardous trends are handicapped by decades of conventional defense bias and
adherence to the four failed assumptions.
On balance, the study team perceives that the risks associated with inaction are, in
reality, potentially higher and more permanent than those typically associated with action. Inaction or ineffective action hazards gradual but nonetheless fundamental loss
of position vis-à-vis competitors. Holding out for the evolution of favorable outcomes
comes with it the prospect for their never coming to pass. In the process, strategic losses
accrue to such an extent that delayed action to recoup them engenders unacceptable
costs.
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Action will always engender significant risk as well. This is especially true for action
that involves threatened use of military force. However, in most cases, action offers advantages to those committed to thorough horizon scanning and planning. That commitment buys some insurance against the worst strategic hazards and gives policymakers
and strategists all the benefits of initiative.
FIVE GRAY ZONE ARCHETYPES
In light of the environmental trends outlined previously in this report, as well as the
appreciation of risk, the study team identified a set of contemporary archetypal gray
zone challenges against which it gauges U.S. defense strategy, plans, and capabilities.
Each archetype offers a brief description of the specific challenge and its character, an
analysis of recent U.S. actions in response to it, and finally, key risk judgments. The five
archetypes considered are:
• “The Dragon.” China is a revisionist actor. It demonstrates an artful ability to
challenge U.S. spheres of influence while skillfully remaining below the threshold of perceived U.S. redlines.
• “The Bear.” Russia too is a revisionist actor. It demonstrates an ability to adapt to
the 21st century, innovatively reasserting its influence by combining traditional
and non-traditional methods and capabilities.
• “The Lion.” Iran is a hybrid revisionist/rejectionist actor seeking to expand its
regional influence by asserting itself into a fragile—sometimes disordered—environment that favors bold, purposeful action.
• “The Scorpion.” A disordered and devolving MENA environment characterized
by vulnerable, failed, or fractured states is fertile ground for the hybrid combination of malevolent state and nonstate actors.
• “The Eagle.” Although currently a status quo power, the United States has at
times been an effective gray zone actor itself. It can learn a great deal from its
experiences. In addition, competitors will pace themselves according to the past
American example.
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Analysis of Gray Zone Archetypes
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VI. ENTER THE DRAGON – CHINA AS A HIGH-END
GRAY ZONE REVISIONIST
“The supreme art of war is to subdue your enemies without fighting.”
-Sun Tzu28

ASIA’S LOOMING GRAY ZONE CHALLENGE
Emboldened by more than 2 decades of significant economic growth, expanding
political influence, increasing military capability, and rising nationalism, the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) has become a capable rival to dominant U.S. influence in the
Asia-Pacific region. China is currently without peer in its ability to present American
decision-makers with complex strategic-level dilemmas underwritten by the resources
and guile of a capable and driven revisionist power.
China’s rapid multi-dimensional growth as a rising great power, as well as its deliberate, artful, and modulated employment
of the tangible fruits of that growth,
Strategic Insights—Enter the Dragon
have enabled it to effectively challenge
U.S. position in the region. To date, the
• China is a revisionist actor. It demonstrates an
PRC has practiced its brand of reviartful ability to challenge U.S. spheres of influence while skillfully avoiding perceived U.S.
sionist counter-U.S. resistance entirely
redlines.
in the gray zone. It employs different
combinations of influence, intimida• China is building A2AD capabilities to picket its
disputed territorial interests in the first island
tion, coercion, and veiled aggression to
chain and the South China Sea; employing influapproach, probe, and, at times, violate
ence, intimidation, and coercion to achieve warperceived U.S./partner redlines while
like ends and contest U.S. regional dominance.
skillfully remaining below the thresh• Beijing’s campaign-like gray zone competition
old of outright military provocation.29
integrates all elements of national power. The
China’s campaign-like approach
U.S. response to it is still evolving.
to gray zone competition and con• “Risk of inaction” appears to be a principal
flict liberally mixes political, military,
source of defense-relevant hazard with respect
and commercial instruments. China
to China.
employs its military and paramilitary forces, government agencies, and
state-owned enterprises as weapons.
Its methods include aggressive commercial expansion, non-violent coercive military
force, the intimidating use of law enforcement and maritime paramilitary capabilities,
as well as extensive exploitation of cyber and information operations.30
So far, these actions have enabled China to contest and sometimes dominate competitive spaces and thereby achieve warlike aims without resorting to warlike violence.31 As
China appears to gain ground vis-à-vis the United States via these methods, American
strategists and decision-makers hazard the appearance of paralysis, decline, and unreliability as the region’s security partner of choice. Failure, in this regard, would overturn
70-plus years of alliance confidence and create new and worrisome vulnerabilities for
U.S. security and commercial interests in the region.
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STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT: A PROFOUNDLY INSECURE ASIA
U.S. economic and security interests are inextricably linked to developments in the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia,
creating a mix of evolving challenges and opportunities. Accordingly…we will of necessity
rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region.
—2012 Defense Strategic Guidance32

In the 2012 “Defense Strategic Guidance,” the President outlined an American strategic rebalance or “pivot” to the Asia-Pacific region.33 A stable, peaceful, and thriving AsiaPacific region is widely acknowledged as critical to American security and prosperity.
Four of seven operative mutual defense treaties, for example, involve U.S. relationships
with Asia-Pacific nations (Japan, South Korea, Australia-New Zealand, and the Philippines).34 Further, seven of the United States’ top 15 trading partners are members of the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum (Canada, Mexico, PRC, Japan, South
Korea, Vietnam, and Taiwan) and approximately 60 percent of all U.S. export goods are
sold in the Asia-Pacific region. 35 The latter two factors, in particular, are likely to experience material increases as regional economies are on track to grow faster than the world
average for some time.36 In light of these factors, the region as a whole is certain to grow
even more important in U.S. security calculations.
Evidenced by the rebalance, Asia looms large as the most dominant strategic issue
on the DoD’s near-term agenda. The renewed inertia behind securing U.S. Asia-Pacific
interests stems in large measure from a perceived growth in the number, scale, and
intensity of threats to a stable, peaceful, and thriving Asia-Pacific region. The vectors of
potential hazard are manifest, and senior U.S. leaders perceive the interests at stake in
the region to be among the most vital.
For example, the combustible combination of contested sovereignty over disputed
territory and waters, lingering cross-border animus on mainland Asia, and increasing
region-wide militarization (including nuclear proliferation) are creating or exacerbating
flash points between regional powers. The most dangerous or immediate among these
fault lines (e.g., the East and South China Seas, Taiwan, and the Korean Peninsula) not
only undermine the general American interest in regional stability, peace, and prosperity; but also often directly involve the security of U.S. treaty allies. Complicating an
already tense environment, the region is not immune from falling victim to or exporting
the same violent extremist activity plaguing the Middle East.
In addition to the aforementioned traditional security challenges, there are more fundamental, less purposeful threats to human security emerging from the region as well.
Asia has 57 percent of the world’s population and eight of the world’s top 10 megacities.37 These facts, combined with the Asia-Pacific region’s history as the world’s most
disaster-prone, create a recipe for serial future catastrophe.38 Asia’s concentrated human
vulnerability and the persistent prospect for natural, man-made, or man–enabled disaster co-exist in the region, often to devastating effect.
This is particularly true for vulnerable populations living along the littorals, near
or astride dangerous seismic fault lines, in the path of unpredictable and often deadly
weather patterns; or in general, where the worst effects of underdevelopment and climate change are likeliest to collide. These combined effects increase the likelihood the
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Asia-Pacific region will not only be gripped by persistent high-end military tensions
in places like the Korean Peninsula, the East Asian Littoral, and the South China Sea
(SCS) but also that Asia and the wider Pacific region will remain uniquely vulnerable
to unanticipated strategic-level disaster as well. Each has the potential to be profoundly
destabilizing and disruptive.
A RISING CHINA AS A DEFENSE PACER
While all the factors previously described figure into U.S. defense calculations in the
Asia-Pacific region, China’s emergence as a capable great power rival dominates U.S.
defense strategy. In short, there would be no rebalance required without the PRC moving as dramatically as it has into a prominent position vis-à-vis the United States.
China’s rise is explained as much by its long and deep historical and cultural experience as it is from deliberate actions taken by those recent and current leaders most
identified with its ascendance to great power status. Sino-centrism has framed Chinese
thinking for centuries. It is embodied in the belief that China is a superior civilization
with a legitimate claim as the cultural center of the world. In Mandarin, China’s name
literally translates to “Middle Kingdom.”39 Thus, China’s renewed activist strategy to
ascend to great power is rooted in the idea of assuming its rightful place in world affairs.
China is clearly also driven by a desire to redress wrongs it has incurred at the hands
of foreign powers. The “Century of Humiliation,” for example, was the period extending from the first Opium War in the mid-19th century to the post-World War II era.
During that time, China suffered defeat in major wars, unraveled politically, and serially
succumbed to the demands of outside powers.40 While both Chiang Kai-shek and Mao
Tse-Tung declared an end to the Century of Humiliation in 1945 and 1949 respectively,
the effect of this disastrous period on the psychology of the Chinese people and leadership continues to serve as a unifying reference for nationalist sentiment.41
These cultural and historical factors underpin more recent developments in China’s
pursuit of great power status. The most significant of these is the dramatic growth of the
Chinese economy. Beginning in 1978 under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, China instituted a series of economic reforms known as “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”
following the death of Mao Tse-Tung. These reforms included the de-collectivization of
agriculture, an opening up to foreign investments, privatization of state-owned industries, and the establishment of a market economy.42
The reforms launched China on a path that catapulted it from an economy of less
than $200 billion in gross domestic product (GDP) in 1978 to an economy boasting over
$10 trillion in GDP today.43 China is currently the second largest economy in the world
and remains one of the fastest growing. It is projected to overtake the United States by
2026.44
Enabled by robust economic growth, China has taken significant steps to transform
its military into a modern, capable force. Its focus and pacers are clearly U.S. joint forces.
Chinese military forces have evolved and are approaching peer-like status to even the
most advanced U.S. forces operating in the Asia-Pacific region.
As in the case of China’s economic reforms, Deng initiated Chinese military reform as well. Under Deng, China began sweeping military reforms that have included
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transforming organizational structure, education, doctrine, training, and force modernization.45 For example, China’s modern ballistic missile arsenal poses one of the most
dangerous threats to U.S. and allied security in the region. Capabilities like the DF-21
anti-ship ballistic missile—nicknamed the “Carrier Killer”—have increased anxiety inside the Pentagon over the ability of the U.S. military to project power in the region.
Additionally, China recently began construction of the first domestically built aircraft
carrier in December 2015 and plans to build at least one more over the next 15 years.46
In all cases, Chinese military modernization is paced by threats it perceives from U.S./
partner defense policy and capabilities. Virtually all of China’s most significant military
reforms focus on matching or countering U.S. military operations and assets.
CHINA’S LENS
From China’s perspective, it sees seven main sources of potential threat:47
• Hostile foreign influence in its domestic and economic affairs; 48
• Bordering countries;49
• The United States and its perceived strategy of “containment;”50
• U.S. regional allies challenging highly valued resources in the South and East
China Seas;51
• A potential Korean conflict that could include WMD use;52
• Internationally sponsored violent extremist terrorism;53 and finally,
• Internal, domestic challenges to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
Among these, the last is the most worrisome for China. The steadily worsening impacts of smog and wastewater are manifest in healthcare costs, domestic dissatisfaction,
and loss of international legitimacy. Additionally, the loss of near coast fisheries and
organic ocean resources are mounting problems plaguing the CCP.54
Other challenges include domestic unrest driven by high unemployment, blowback
from China’s expanding state control of property, and forceful eviction of former landowners.55 Another challenge is the ever-present CCP obligation of providing adequate
sources of nutrition and reasonable quality of life for over a billion Chinese citizens.56
Finally, there is internal pressure on China’s ruling elite to fulfill their binding promise
to a long-suffering population—a world-leading economic rise and realization of superpower ambitions.57
In the face of these internal and external challenges, China’s overall strategy appears
focused on three principal goals:
• Maintain communist party rule;
• Gain, secure, and sustain the resources essential to a steady, peaceful rise;
and finally,
• Revise the current world order in its favor and achieve global superpower
status.58
To pursue these goals, China has to gain access to vast raw materials from within
China, as well as in Southeast Asia, Africa, and North and South America. Further, it
needs to be able to access the best commercial and technological advantages to create
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and exploit new opportunities. This likely will entail illicit cyber activity that enables
access to and exploitation of privileged foreign government and business data.
In spite of enormous demographic, resource, and environmental challenges, China
will also need to find innovative ways to increase its economic capacity as well. Finally,
to underwrite its emergence to great power, China will need to continue to modernize
its large military that is increasingly competitive regionally but still qualitatively behind
its principal U.S. rival in many important respects.59
CHINA’S GRAY ZONE APPROACH
To avoid open conflict, China pursues its objectives almost entirely in the gray zone.
One such prominent gray zone approach is its reliance on military and paramilitary
intimidation and the non-violent use of military force.
China boasts the world’s second highest defense budget and the world’s largest military, making its forces extremely effective instruments of intimidation, coercion, and
veiled aggression. China’s employment of military and paramilitary force and forces can
effectively deter rivals attempting to counter gray zone activity. By hinting or implying
that armed escalation may be its next course of action, China effectively boxes in less
powerful or more risk averse opponents.60 For instance, the PLA has acquired and arrayed complex A2AD capabilities to counter U.S. and allied military interference. They
have built up islands in the SCS as bases. They are deploying larger numbers of stealthy
diesel submarines, advanced air defenses and sea-mines, and sophisticated ballistic and
cruise missiles.61
China is increasing its A2AD capabilities through the construction of aircraft and
submarine bases extending out from its coastline (e.g. Hainan Island and the Spratly Islands).62 This longer reach enables China to conduct anti-access operations from forward
land-based locations without overextending the PLA Navy. It also allows the PLA Navy
to focus more on blue-water operations with limited numbers of aircraft carriers.63 Additionally, China’s development of exo-atmospheric missiles and counter-satellite lasers
threaten to deny critical U.S. abilities.64 These anti-access threats are reminders of the
high cost that might be associated with active U.S. military interference with Chinese
pursuits.65
While China’s military activities are concerning by themselves, its gray zone approach involves significant blending of the military and softer non-military instruments
of power. Recent examples are China’s pledge to provide several thousand designated United Nations (UN) peacekeeping forces along with UN development funds for
worldwide employment and deliberate moves to promote China’s international image.
China’s establishment of the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank to diminish the power
of established Western institutions like the World Bank in favor of Chinese-controlled
interests is also a deliberate step.66
Additionally, the subsidizing of its SCS civilian fishing fleets provides satellite-based
marine radios that help China to surveil and picket the SCS and harass “trespassing”
fishing boats, commercial vessels, and ships employed in resource exploration.67 Finally,
the Chinese-owned Offshore Oil Corporation (COOC) has now procured the most capable oil-drilling platform in the SCS (guarded by China’s military and law enforcement
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fleets).68 Due to China’s successful intimidation and interdiction of rival SCS resource
claimants, the COOC now conducts drilling operations across the SCS at depths beyond
the capability of any regional competitor.69
In the information sphere, China has moved away from using terms like “peaceful
rise” and “peaceful development,” in favor of the tougher terms President Xi uses to
communicate China’s intent to redress historical Western bullying.70 Moreover, China
made a detailed claim in front of the UN describing its “9-Dashed Line” interpretation
of SCS boundaries.71 China also claims this boundary on all internal maps and Chinese
passports as a definitive statement of Chinese sovereignty.72 In an attempt to drive a
wedge between the United States and its regional allies, China also frequently cites U.S.
reluctance to intervene in Syria and Ukraine as proof that the United States is an unreliable partner, thus setting up China as the natural alternative security partner of choice.73
China is also waging a form of “lawfare” by employing law enforcement assets to
warn off and bully competitor oil companies and fishing fleets in the SCS.74 China has
used its law enforcement ships—the region’s largest and most capable—to physically
interdict, collide with, and coerce its neighbors’ smaller vessels; thereby leaving the dilemma of acquiescence or escalation in the hands of its opponents.75 Moreover, by demonstrating quasi-legal control over significant portions of the South and East China Seas,
China hopes to establish irreversible facts on the ground.76
Finally, the United States has observed considerable Chinese activity in the cyber
and espionage realms.77 U.S. organizations and networks appear to suffer significant
cyber penetration, which allows China to stay ahead of U.S. Government and commercial decision-makers, reduces its strategic uncertainty, and mitigates risk.78 For example,
non-attributable cyber intrusion and espionage greatly lower the costs of Chinese research and development by reaping the classified and/or proprietary knowledge of U.S.
defense laboratories and businesses. This eliminates the normal attendant investment
and operating costs associated with research and development.79 The Chinese cyber capability also allows them to influence adversaries by showing China’s cyber reach and
disruptive and destructive cyber capability.80
China’s comprehensive gray zone approach uses indirect methods and ambiguous
international legal frameworks to pursue revisionist ambitions. These activities have
set China on a trajectory toward effectively contesting U.S. regional dominance and an
active renegotiation of the U.S.-led international order.81 As such, it constitutes the most
sophisticated and classically dangerous of this study’s four competitor archetypes.82
CURRENT U.S. AND PARTNER APPROACH:
WALK SOFTLY AND HOPE FOR THE BEST
While the United States has taken some assertive actions in the region, it has generally been cautious in dealing with Beijing. This cautious U.S. approach includes a host
of actions spanning the instruments of power. Diplomatically, the United States has attempted to strengthen alliances and partnerships in the region, successfully enlisting the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations in promoting freedom of navigation. The United
States has publicly sided with Japan and their claims to administer governance over
the Senkaku Islands, clearing up what has been ambiguity in its position on the mat38

ter. However, the United States remains silent and mostly ambiguous in its position on
territorial claims in the SCS. Failing to take sides when those claims meet the standards
of international law seems only to embolden China to continue its regional irredentist
activities.
Economically, the United States has championed the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
as a solid trade agreement to help counter China’s economic influence in the region,
but the sluggish process of passing TPP in the U.S. Senate threatens to undermine what
could be a critical economic lever.83 Militarily, the United States has been a persistent
presence in the region. However, while it maintains numerous strategic bases in and
around Northeast Asia and the East Asian Littoral, it has less consistently used these
bases to operate with purpose in and around Chinese interests and claims. In a word,
U.S. forces have not normalized or routinized operations with respect to China in ways
that send clear messages about the limits of China’s claims. Given the option of operating and assuming risk, U.S. leadership has instead consistently opted to avoid escalation
at virtually any cost.
Information may be China’s least effective lever. This may offer opportunities for
U.S. gray zone exploitation. The Chinese have exposed weaknesses in three areas. All
three-exhibit potential as focus points for information campaigns targeting PRC legitimacy as a reliable and responsible power. First, China fails to recognize long-standing
and widely accepted standards for international maritime law.84 Second, China’s poor
human rights record exposes it to severe criticism on major issues involving political
leadership.85 Finally, recent environmental problems involving air quality in Chinese
cities, along with depleted fishing reserves and damaged coral reefs in the SCS present
dilemmas for a Beijing Government intent on being recognized as a responsible great
power.86 In all three areas, the United States has opportunities to demonstrate its commitment to the extant global order in a way that undermines Chinese leverage.
RISK—GIVE AN INCH, TAKE AN OCEAN
Risks with respect to U.S.-PRC military relations are manifest. There are significant
risks of inaction due to missed opportunities to clarify U.S./partner redlines.87 For example, in areas where the United States has sent clear signals like the Japanese Senkaku
Islands, the Chinese have not proceeded with the same island building approaches they
undertook in the SCS.88 However, when the United States does not clearly stand firm on
its interest in freedom of navigation elsewhere, it abdicates at least some of the legitimacy narrative to China and reduces allied and partner confidence in U.S. commitment.89
In addition, there is abundant risk of action due to potential errors in military operations
and the attendant potential for unwanted escalation.90
A great number of the aforementioned hazards are in fact emerging, eroding U.S.
and partner confidence, and contributing to a regional arms race.91 This has increased
the overall prospect for escalation to open hostilities in the South or East China Seas.92
This is less likely to emerge from purposeful and open Chinese military aggression and
more because U.S. treaty allies and regional partners, facing a daily gray zone agitation
by China, will lose patience or discipline at the tactical or operational level—triggering
an uncontrolled and unwanted military escalation.93
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If the United States fails to compete effectively in the gray zone, it hazards ceding
power, initiative, and influence in the Asia-Pacific region, putting vital national security
interests in jeopardy. Though China is pursuing a calculated strategy using all instruments of national power, the United States is more than capable of producing immediate
and non-escalatory options to counter China’s gray zone activities and maintain a position of gray zone advantage.
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VII. RE-ENTER THE BEAR – THE NEW RUSSIAN HYBRID THREAT
“A great wind is blowing, and that gives you either imagination or a headache.” 94

—Catherine the Great

TRUMPED BY A HYBRID SPOILER
Like China, Russia is a driven and capable revisionist challenger. Of late, it has routinely demonstrated an ability to effectively assert significant influence by identifying
and exploiting opportunities. Most often, these opportunities emerge in the failure (e.g.,
Syria) or vulnerability (e.g., Georgia and Ukraine) of others. Russia adapts to these conditions and seizes on their attendant opportunities by innovatively combining traditional and non-traditional coercive methods and capabilities with an often-masterful
manipulation of conditions in the
political, economic, and information
Strategic Insights—Re-Enter the Bear
domains.
• Russia is a driven and capable revisionist chalRenewed Russian influence has
lenger. It asserts influence by identifying and
come about largely with Vladimir Puexploiting opportunities through innovative
tin’s rise and consolidation of power.
combinations of traditional and non-traditional
Putin has officially or unofficially ruled
methods and capabilities.
Russia since 1999, serving as both Pres• Russia integrates multiple non-military instruident and Prime Minister. In Putin’s
ments with the hybrid application of sanctioned
17-years in power, Russia has moved
violence and military power to exploit U.S./Eudecisively from the depths of Cold War
ropean vulnerabilities in a graduated gray zone
approach.
failure to the increasing heights of resurgent and influential trans-regional
• The U.S. and allied responses to Russian gray
power.
zone activism are more reactive than proactive.
Indeed, renewed Russian assertive• Risk of action/inaction appear equally unpalatness is the hallmark of Putin’s leaderable. However, failure to act assertively to shore
ship tenure. That assertiveness has
up alliance strength and durability hazards seemanifested in myriad forms of aggresing NATO fail decisively.
sive and competitive behavior along
Russia’s periphery and beyond. These
behaviors range from hybrid military action in the Russian near abroad (Georgia and
Ukraine) through manipulation of European energy supplies and coercive information
campaigns against neighboring states.95
While much of Russia’s recent adventurism has triggered adverse U.S./Western responses, the responses have largely been limited to rhetorical protests, symbolic military
gestures, and economic sanctions.96 Moreover, in all cases, Russia’s activities have both
remained well below the West’s vague threshold of unambiguous provocation and have
also occurred in the shadow of Russia’s latent destructive and disruptive military potential. Therefore, all of its actions have yet to trigger more aggressive and, by implication,
more risk-laden responses.
To date, Russia holds too many powerful trump cards for risk-conscious Western
policymakers. Russia’s lurking nuclear and conventional military capability, as well as
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its control over important high-demand commodities and lines of communication afford
it significant latitude in pursuing interests without fear of meaningful consequences. To
date, it has run right up against key U.S. and allied redlines but has not yet decisively
breached them. This will no doubt incentivize continued probing by the Putin regime.
Without question, Russian adventurism challenges U.S. standing in Europe. To the
extent its aggressive behavior continues absent what it perceives to be meaningful and
effective U.S. and European responses, it is likely to undermine NATO’s long-term
credibility as well.
STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT—LONG GRAY ROAD TO REVIVAL
The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe,
and the rise of the power and influence of the European Union (EU)—all byproducts of
Soviet Cold War failure—have defined Russia’s contemporary decision-making environment. Recent Russian history had a profound impact on Vladimir Putin. So much so
that in 2005, he called the Soviet Union’s collapse “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe
of the [20th] century.”97
In light of this perspective, Putin’s strategy appears aimed at reversing Russia’s decline, establishing it as Eastern Europe’s dominant power, and returning Russia to a
global standing on par or competing with the world’s other great powers. Toward that
end, and 25 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has moved decisively
to advance all three goals. Under Putin’s leadership, Russia has restored a functioning
(if somewhat fragile) economy and it has rebuilt its military into a more modern and
capable force. On both counts, the Russians themselves recognize there is much more to
accomplish.98
The steps so far are consistent with Russia’s ultimately realizing what Leon Aron
calls “the Putin Doctrine.”99 According to Aron, the Putin Doctrine consists of three primary foreign policy goals. The first is maintaining Russia as a nuclear superpower. The
second sees Russia attaining and being recognized as a great power in all facets of its
international activity. Finally, the third sees Russia achieving and maintaining political,
military, and economic hegemony over its near abroad.100
The third and final component creates the greatest uncertainty and instability; Russia
appears to be seeking revival of former Soviet aspirations under new leadership. One
aspect of this Soviet revivalism is traceable to the early 1990s.
Shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s nascent post-Soviet military
strategy Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (November 1993) set
the stage for Russian adventurism in its near abroad. It explicitly called for “the introduction of Russian forces into newly sovereign states if perceived ‘suppression’ of Russian
minorities occurs.”101 Even today, this theme is a consistent cover for Russian gray zone
activity along its periphery.102 In addition, as it ostensibly protects the minority rights of
at-risk Russian expatriates through influence, intimidation, coercion, and aggression, it
also progressively extends the reach of the Russian state well beyond its frontiers.
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Like China, Russia has largely pursued its more ambitious objectives through gray
zone competition and conflict. It employs some combination of premeditation and opportunism in all of its endeavors, at times seeming to deliberately move step-by-step and
at other times, seizing opportunities afforded by target states and populations. What is
clear, however, is that Russia intentionally adapts its approach over time to accommodate changing conditions and maintain advantage.
Andrei Tsygankov argues that Putin pursued a course of pragmatic cooperation
with the West early in his tenure as President.103 Toward that end, Russia entered into
mutually beneficial bilateral partnerships with the United States and many of its European partners. This ultimately provided the oxygen for Russia’s eventual post-Cold War
economic and military revival.
Tsygankov concludes that the more cooperative Russian tone and approach toward
the United States changed around 2005 as it embarked on a much more aggressive and
assertive path.104 Russia’s growing economy, built on high oil prices and European petrochemical demand, provided the means for even more rapid economic growth and a
transformation of Russia’s hobbled military forces.105
Along the way, Russia devised new ways to counter Western conventional military
power. In particular, it learned from U.S. successes in the various American post-Cold
War conflicts; from the Persian Gulf War (1991) to the early, purely military, successes
of U.S. forces in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003).106 Russia’s new approaches have at
times even extended into the taboo territory of nuclear weapons as well. For example,
Putin recently issued threats of nuclear attack against states that dared interfere with
pursuit of Russian objectives.107 This new assertive approach ultimately set the stage for
Russian hybrid intimidation and aggression in Georgia, Estonia, and Ukraine.
Russia’s Gray Zone Approach—The Gerasimov Model.
In recent years, Russia has demonstrated a willingness to integrate multiple nonmilitary instruments with the hybrid application of sanctioned violence and military
power to achieve its most important policy objectives. Contemporary theorists characterize Russia’s military strategy as hybrid warfare. According to Frank Hoffman, hybrid
warfare “incorporate[s] a range of different modes of warfare including conventional
capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder.”108 It is hybrid because it is the cocktail-like
application of a variety of coercive methods. It is gray because it lies in the space between
the various classical American categorizations of armed conflict. It is neither traditional,
unconventional, nor irregular by itself, but instead, all three in combination.
Beginning in 2013, General Valery Gerasimov—another key figure in Russia’s strategic evolution and Chief of the Russian General Staff—began to comment publicly on his
concept for 21st-century Russian hybrid warfare. The now commonly cited “Gerasimov
Model” is a veritable playbook for purposeful gray zone competition and conflict. Gerasimov argues that the lines between war and peace are now blurred.109
In written work, the General cites the events of the Arab Spring as emblematic of a
21st-century evolution in the course and conduct of warfare.110
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Gerasimov asserts that “the role of non-military means of achieving political and
strategic goals…have exceeded the power of [the] force of weapons in their effectiveness.”111 Gerasimov pays particular attention to the role of information conflict and special operations forces (SOF) that afford new levels of deniability to purposeful combatants.112 Overall, Gerasimov recognizes a shift in the character of warfare away from the
traditional application of conventional military forces toward non-traditional and more
hybrid forms of conflict. In Gerasimov’s design, conventional forces are reserved “primarily for the achievement of final success in the conflict.”113
Two recent conflicts demonstrate how Russia has become comfortable as an assertive
gray zone competitor, employing hybrid war as its instrument of choice. In 2008, well
before Gerasimov described his understanding of modern warfare, Russia and the former Soviet Republic of Georgia engaged in armed conflict for 5 days. Russia’s strategic
objectives in Georgia focused on protecting pro-Russian separatist populations and the
dissuasion of Georgian entry into the NATO alliance.
During the short conflict, Russia combined traditional military formations with local
separatist guerrillas and an aggressive information line of effort.114 In advance of actual
hostilities and consistent with Gerasimov’s description, Russia set conditions in Georgia
by maintaining forces there for years under the guise of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. For example, 1 week before hostilities commenced, Russia completed
repairs to 54 kilometers of railway in Georgia allegedly in support of humanitarian assistance.115 Other evidence references the surge of Russian journalists that arrived in the
South Ossetian capital in order to “cover something big.”116 The apparent sophistication
in preliminary coordination makes it clear that the Russians employed a combination of
military and non-military means without tripping over one or more Western redlines.
Starting in 2014, Russia showed even more sophistication in combining “economic,
informational, humanitarian, and other non-military measures” in its annexation of
Crimea and its hybrid war in Eastern Ukraine.117 In both cases, Russia bolstered ethnic Russian resistance forces with the targeted introduction of its own special forces.118
Further, in Ukraine it has selectively employed Russian conventional forces as combat
multipliers both from over the horizon, as well as within Ukrainian territory itself.119
The war in Ukraine continues today. It pits Russia and pro-Russian separatists on
one side against the Ukrainian Government on the other.120 In line with Gerasimov’s
model, Russia applies a clever combination of military and non-military capabilities “in
coordination with the protest potential of the population” creating game-changing coercive capabilities under a thin but plausible veneer of deniability.121 Until December 2015,
Putin persistently denied a Russian military presence of any stripe in either Crimea or
Ukraine. He finally did acknowledge a modest Russian military presence in both cases
but only after it was both impossible to deny and improbable that anyone outside the
theater would act to dislodge them.122
Current U.S. and Partner Approach—Steady and Slow Wins the Race?
To date, the U.S. and allied responses to Russia’s assertive hybrid form of gray zone
conflict are more reactive than proactive. Since the beginning of the conflict in Crimea
and Ukraine, the United States has demonstrated its support to Ukraine and to its NATO
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allies through Operation ATLANTIC RESOLVE (OAR). OAR is certainly a response.
However, it largely leverages many existing regional military engagement and security
cooperation programs while also demonstrating the need to understand better the risk
of action versus inaction.123
The broad objectives of OAR include “demonstration of [the United States’] continued commitment to the collective security of NATO and dedication to the enduring
peace and stability in the region.”124 OAR recently caused the United States to shift more
emphasis to the Atlantic Alliance and wider European security cooperation. This includes increased interaction with Ukraine, largely in the form of training and general security assistance.125 However, “security cooperation” as a concept is routinely perceived
as a peacetime activity, and is not generally done in the shadow of an active and urgent
contingency threat, like that emerging in Eastern Europe.
A key objective of OAR is demonstrating U.S. commitment to its partners. Specifically, the United States is “conducting military exercises and training…while sustaining a rotational presence across Europe.”126 To accomplish this goal, the U.S. European
Command (EUCOM) is bolstering the infrastructure and logistics that enable NATO
military operations across Eastern Europe.
The United States has dedicated specific assets to accomplish its OAR objectives. In
2015, Congress and the President created the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI),
funded by a $985 million appropriation. The President’s budget request for fiscal year
2017 included an increase of $3.4 billion in ERI funds. Additionally, the United States
has committed military support to several NATO allies in the region.
One form of support includes placing 250-pieces of armored military equipment between Bulgaria, Estonia, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania.127 A variety
of Army, Navy, Air Force, and Special Forces units are supporting the exercise and
training activities specific to OAR as well. Further, the United States announced that it
would begin maintaining a deployed armored brigade combat team in Eastern Europe
on 9-month rotations beginning in fiscal year 2017.128 While OAR appears to be a solid
first step at promoting peace, stability, and cooperation across NATO, an armored brigade spread across thousands of kilometers of Eastern Europe is more of a symbol than
a credible military deterrent.
While OAR is primarily a military response, the United States is implementing other
measures across the U.S. Government. For example, it is actively reinforcing existing
diplomatic partnerships in Europe, first with very public commitments to all 28 NATO
members. In addition, the United States supported the Minsk II Protocol, the second
ceasefire agreement between Ukraine and the Russian-backed separatists. Russia,
Ukraine, France, and Germany co-authored the agreement in February 2015.129
In the economic domain, the United States, in partnership with the EU, initiated a series of economic sanctions against Russia in March 2014 to send a strong message to the
Russian Government of the consequences associated with threatening the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of Ukraine.130 While the effects of sanctions take time, the swift
action by the President reinforced the message that Russian aggression against Ukraine
violates the rules-based international order that the United States and its allies fought
hard to establish and seek to maintain.
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The United States is engaging more forcefully in the information realm as well. U.S.
national leadership placed Russia’s aggression into Ukraine at the top of their talking
points for some time after the crisis began. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter conducted a press conference at NATO Headquarters in Brussels on October 8, 2015, during which he stated that Russia “must stop its aggression in eastern Ukraine, end its
occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea, and live up to its commitments under
the Minsk agreements.”131 However, Russia’s entry into Syria in 2015 shifted the conversation away from Ukraine, highlighting the challenge that the United States has in
dominating a particular narrative in the information environment.
While conservative in scope so far, the United States is attempting to pursue an integrated strategy. For now, it favors diplomatic and economic levers, as well as limited
security assistance over a more assertive demonstration of military capability. However,
it is attempting to weave actions and prospective options into a consistent and credible
information narrative. Russia’s assertive approach rests squarely in the uncertain space
between traditional definitions of war and peace and continues to challenge the U.S.
ability to adapt. The more the United States adheres to a traditional playbook, the more
likely Russia will continue to experience significant success.
Risk—Divided and Conquered?
Given the recent aggressive nature of Russian behavior in Eastern Europe coupled
with Russia’s latent threat to the physical security and integrity of the NATO alliance
and its member states, the stakes involved in actively meeting and turning back Russian
gray zone competition are inherently high. Risk of U.S. action in this environment is
defined mostly by the potential for significant, rapid escalation, with the most obvious
and dangerous threat being nuclear war. Short of nuclear war, the United States and
NATO risk entering into a costly conventional conflict with Russia under conditions of
potential local advantage for Russian forces.
For example, Russia can make entry and effective operations in its border and coastal
regions very problematic. Once in theater, U.S. and allied forces would confront a complex and challenging operating environment. Russia boasts enough sophisticated capabilities in the area of air and missile defense, ballistic and cruise missiles, SOF, and broad
conventional land, air, and sea assets to make effective operations perilous for U.S. and
allied forces.
Risk of U.S. inaction is equally high. The U.S.-NATO alliance has served to protect
most of Europe from Soviet or Russian aggression effectively since World War II. Russia is effectively challenging alliance integrity for the first time through corrosive hybrid resistance to its reach and influence. Failure to act assertively to shore up alliances,
strengths, and durability, hazards seeing NATO fail decisively. Operation ATLANTIC
RESOLVE has obvious limitations in this regard.
Russia has effectively identified and is currently exploiting U.S. and allied vulnerabilities in Eastern Europe to achieve many of its most important strategic objectives.
The “Gerasimov Model” provides key insights into the Russian gray zone playbook,
and Russia’s recent conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine provide evidence of that playbook in action. U.S. decision-makers can find effective counters to Russian hybrid
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approaches; however, doing so will require significant adaptation of the lenses through
which we assess the Russian challenge and the tools and concepts we develop and
employ to counter it.
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VIII. THE UNTAMED LION—IRAN’S 40 YEAR GRAY ZONE CAMPAIGN
“The arrow shot by the archer may or may not kill a single person. . . . But stratagems
devised by wise men can kill even babes in the womb.”
—Kautilya132

THE GRAY ZONE PROBLEM
The Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) is
a consummate revisionist actor seeking
advantage where the forces of rejection
are crippling local authority. It both creates and exploits vulnerabilities in its
regional and extra-regional adversaries.
By doing so, it seeks to expand its reach
and influence.133 The IRI thrives by asserting itself into fragile—sometimes
disordered—environments. This is nogo territory for most state powers, yet
these environments can also favor bold
and purposeful action. Iran has proven
adept at advantaging itself through
these circumstances.
In many respects, Iran is a classic
revolutionary state in that it shields
its own vulnerability by cultivating or
advantaging itself in the weakness of
others. At its core, survival is the IRI’s
dominant motivation. In an assessment
reminiscent of today, a 1979 Department of State report explained Iran in
the following way:

Strategic Insights—The Untamed Lion
•

Iran is a consummate revisionist actor seeking
advantage where forces of rejection cripple local
authority; it shields its vulnerability by cultivating or advantaging itself in the weakness of others. Efforts to create an Iraqi client are illustrative.

•

Iran seeks to undermine its regional competitors
by supporting partners, e.g. Hezbollah, that create instability. Concurrently, Iran seeks to create a physical buffer between it and the United
States with a strong A2AD network and unconventional approaches to territorial defense.

•

As Iran does not seek direct confrontation with
the United States, defense choices lie with a U.S.Iranian proxy war or with permanently removing the threat of a nuclear Iran.

•

The U.S.-Iran dilemma embodies the uncertain
risk-reward trade-off involved in gray zone
challenges. Action-cooperative or coercive and
inaction create near equal prospects for favorable and unfavorable outcomes.

It is clear that we are dealing with an outlook that differs from our own… Our [U.S.] character, our society, are based on optimism… Iran, on the other hand, has a long and painful
history of foreign invasions, occupations, and dominations. Their outlook is a function of this
history and the solace most Iranians have found in Shi’a Islam. They place a premium on
survival.134

A TRANSFORMATIONAL REBIRTH
The IRI was born in its current form nearly 40 years ago. Due to an inability to implement sweeping political, social, and economic reform, Shah Reza Pahlavi unwittingly
set conditions for 1979’s game-changing Islamic revolution.135
Leading up to 1979, Iran served as one of the United States’ closest regional partners.
U.S. decision-makers saw Iran as a moderate Muslim nation with enormous natural
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wealth. They considered Iran as a linchpin for security in the Persian Gulf, as it was
avowedly anti-communist. Iran had maintained cordial economic and security relations
with Israel. Moreover, it demonstrated both the capability and will to employ its military forces against perceived communist threats in the region consistent with U.S. interests.136 The Iranian revolution, the fall of the Shah, the rise of the Islamic Republic, and
a long standoff with the United States over the fate of 52-U.S. diplomats during the Iran
hostage crisis destroyed the U.S.-Iranian relationship virtually overnight. Since the crisis
year of 1979, the United States and Iran have been locked in perpetual gray zone conflict.
Iran’s successor theocratic regime has since discovered a modern animating interpretation of the “Persian Empire,” and it pursues expansive and—from the United States
perspective—destabilizing interests according to it. Because Iran’s revolutionary leadership perceive the United States to be responsible for both installing and sustaining the
former Pahlavi regime in power, they also persistently view the United States as the
IRI’s principal threat to survival.137 Consequently, and in order to secure the IRI against
perceived U.S. interference, Iranian leadership has prosecuted a nearly 40-year gray
zone campaign to keep the United States and U.S. regional partners at bay.138
As a principal goal toward that end, the IRI has aggressively sought to prevent outside powers from again intruding in and attempting to dictate terms regarding both
Iran’s internal and external affairs.139 However, hampered by decades of U.S./West isolation, the IRI faces significant obstacles in this regard. Principal among them are serious
military limitations.
Iran cannot yet project conventional military power much beyond its frontiers.140
While it may possess enough advanced military capability now (e.g. ballistic and cruise
missiles and advanced air defenses) to impose real costs on an intervening external
power, it cannot yet either secure itself totally against effective military intervention or
employ its military at some range in a sustained campaign beyond its borders.141 This
situation may not necessarily endure. To the extent that Iran finds ways to increase its
conventional power projection capability, its hybrid military potential will only increase.
IRAN’S BEST DEFENSE—CREATE MULTIPLE DILEMMAS
Currently, Iran pursues its highly gray hybrid strategy along three supporting lines
of effort (LOEs). First, the IRI engages in just enough high political engagement to complicate unified international opposition to it. It actively pursues mutually beneficial political and security arrangements with other broadly sympathetic revisionist actors like
Russia and China in order to balance against U.S. strength in its backyard.142 At the same
time, the IRI engages directly with the United States and other Western opponents to
gain some relief from isolation and sanction and, at the same time, splinters the unity
among those inclined toward a more aggressive counter-Iranian position.143
Second, Iran actively supports regional rejectionist forces that are fast emerging from
deteriorating order in the volatile Middle East and are at war with status quo Arab powers. Further, it bolsters a handful of state allies that are succumbing to the same increasing disorder. Iranian support for Shi’a militias in Iraq since 2003, Houthi Shi’a rebels in
Yemen, and Hezbollah in Lebanon represent the former. Iran’s support for the Iraqi and
Syrian Governments is an example of the latter.
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Iranian support for terrorists, proxy paramilitaries, and political opposition movements actively resisting the authority of avowed Iranian adversaries like Israel and
the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) Sunni monarchies creates one set of problems;
whereas, IRI intervention against emergent Sunni-dominated extremist groups in places
like Iraq and Syria creates wholly different challenges. In one case, the United States
defends the status quo against Iranian predations, and in another, Iranian and American
interests align and require rationalization. Iran’s principal weapon in its secret wars is
the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps-Quds Force (IRGC)-(QF). The QF is Iran’s most
powerful, force multiplying, hybrid warfare instrument.
For a relatively small investment, Iran’s terrorist and paramilitary clients and proxies—often underwritten by QF—effectively represent IRI interests while limiting Iran’s
direct exposure and liability. At times, these groups undermine and weaken other
states.144 At other times, Iran’s unconventional allies serve as foils against the regime’s
strongest state opponents. For example, they discourage Iran’s principal adversaries
from costly intervention, promising excessive costs and indeterminate or uncertain outcomes as a price for interference.145
It does not appear that Iran seeks to establish client states. Instead, Iran seeks to undermine its regional competitors by supporting partners that create instability. Further,
because these groups are cutouts for direct Iranian commitment, the IRI can plausibly
deny direct involvement and mask their specific volition and intent.
A third line of effort involves the employment or threatened employment of Iran’s
significant unconventional and hybrid military and paramilitary capability. As highlighted previously, significant challenges exist for Iran in the area of conventional military capabilities and operations. Yet, the Iranians have found ways to offset their conventional military limitations with more unconventional and hybrid solutions. Iran has
pursued a multi-track effort based on improving its conventional, unconventional, and
strategic capabilities. Further, Iran has cultivated security relationships and is engaged
in new levels of military cooperation with U.S. rivals Russia and China.146
In the purely military sphere, Iran has found ways to employ the inherent advantages of its geography to threaten U.S./partner power projection calculations, as well as
the transit of global commerce through the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. Iranian
military strategy is predicated on three key pillars: “deterrence, asymmetrical escalation, and attrition warfare.”147 Over the last 2 decades, it has pursued military doctrine
and capabilities focused less on defeating stronger adversaries and more on driving up
their cost calculations.
Toward that end, Iran has dramatically increased important A2AD and counter-maritime capabilities to impose costs and limit U.S./partner freedom of action.148 It boasts
what former USCENTCOM Commander General Lloyd Austin called “the largest and
most diverse ballistic missile arsenal in the Middle East.”149 In addition, its doctrine and
capabilities for the defense of Iranian territory, waters, and airspace hinge on complex
hybrid approaches that complicate U.S./partner military planning and drive up risk.150
For example, Iran is likely to leverage a combination of swarming small boats, sophisticated air defense, cruise missiles, drones, and matrixed irregular forces to create
dilemmas for intervening forces.151 The mix of Iranian military capabilities and the doctrine for employing them imply a focus on holding U.S./partner targets in the region
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at risk via strikes from over the horizon or hybrid assaults while maintaining the capability to exact severe penalties on attempts to penetrate Iranian borders, airspace, and
territorial waters.
STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT—U.S.-IRANIAN DYNAMICS
Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran’s pervasive sense of grievance and vulnerability dominate both its exercise of political authority and its national security risk calculations. IRI decision-makers are acutely conscious of Iran’s past and still see the IRI
as a perpetual victim of Western exploitation. According to Ambassador Ryan Crocker,
“For Iran, there is no such thing as history; it is still the present.”152 Mindful of Iran’s
former status, Iran’s leadership seeks to enhance Iranian regional and global standing
and guarantee Iran’s security from the perceived predations of those it believes are most
committed to standing in the way.
There is a zero-sum relationship between Iran, the United States, and the U.S.’s closest partners and allies. Iran acts aggressively to shield the revolution and expand its
reach and influence—often well-outside of the norms of the U.S.-led status quo. In response, the United States and its allies/partners push back against what they perceive to
be illegitimate Iranian activism and, in the process, increase Iranian insecurity, perpetuate mutual hostility, and hazard vertical or horizontal escalation. The fundamentals for
anything other than persistent mutual enmity and competition are simply not present
nor are they anticipated to be present any time soon.153 Thus, Iran’s gray zone campaign
is likely to persist and evolve for the foreseeable future. The deep-seeded hostility and
mistrust on both sides of the U.S.-Iran equation are the products of important threads in
Iranian history, Iran’s unique post-revolution worldview, and the American intersection
with both.
NO PEACE, NO WAR—PERSISTENT U.S.-IRANIAN GRAY ZONE CONFLICT
A persistently high level of mutual insecurity is the best way to characterize U.S.-Iranian relations since 1979. For example, eager to counter what U.S. officials perceived to
be a toxic (and potentially contagious) Iranian revolution, the United States chose sides
in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. In the course of that conflict when the so-called “Tanker
War” threatened unimpeded passage of petroleum supplies through the Persian Gulf,
the United States re-flagged and escorted Kuwaiti tankers to safeguard them against
Iranian attack. This at times resulted in hostile action between U.S. and Iranian forces.
The Iran-Iraq War’s unimaginable brutality and human toll—an estimated one million
Iranian dead—only strengthened the new Iranian regime and intensified the enmity
between Iran and the United States.
Americans have died at the hands of presumed Iranian-sponsored violence as well.
In Lebanon (1983) and Saudi Arabia (1996), Iranian-sponsored terrorist surrogates in
the Middle East attacked U.S. forces causing a devastating effect.154 However, by and
large, direct violent confrontation between U.S. and Iranian military forces has been the
exception and not the rule since the late 1980s. Instead, the United States and Iran have
engaged in “a kind of Cold War” over the last quarter century.155
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For example, following the first American Gulf War, the U.S. pursued a very traditional politico-military “dual containment” strategy focused on limiting the freedom of
maneuver of both Iran and Iraq simultaneously.156 With the onset of Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM, U.S.-Iranian tensions increased as Iran acted
through proxies to complicate American military operations and manipulate political
outcomes in its favor. Since the emergence of the IRI, Iranian leadership has employed
similar forms of surrogate terrorist, paramilitary violence, and political agitation around
the region (and world) as its principal instruments of power projection. Targets have included and continue to include the GCC states, Israel, and Yemen among many others.157
Further, in addition to an obvious interest in counter-extremism, much of the American security cooperation program with the GCC remains focused on countering Iranian
conventional (and potentially nuclear) military capability. For their part, the Iranians
have opted for a cost imposing defense strategy that leverages ballistic and cruise missiles, sophisticated air defenses, and niche maritime capabilities (e.g., small boats, mines,
and attack submarines). Iran also, until recently, maintained an opaque nuclear program
that at a minimum threatened rapid breakout to full nuclear capability as an instrument of regional intimidation.158 The United States has developed strategies to counterbalance Iran’s strategies by maintaining a robust U.S. military presence in the region,
as well as arming U.S. regional partners with the necessary tools to minimize Iranian
options.
CURRENT U.S. AND PARTNER APPROACH—INCOMPATIBLE WORLDVIEWS
Contemporary Iran’s persistent search for security is the glue that binds and motivates all Iranian actions.159 Since the revolution, every subsequent Iranian regime
pursued two parallel LOEs toward a secure and prosperous IRI. The first concerns the
perpetuation of the Iranian Revolution and focuses on security and active resistance to
foreign interference. 160 The second concerns the future of Iran as an Islamic Republic and
the long-term success of Iran’s Persian-Shi’a civil development model.161
The first of these has been the principal rub between Iran and the United States for
nearly 40 years. In spite of U.S. unease about Iranian motives and intentions, there is
remarkable consistency in IRI behavior on important aspects of international security:
there is a cold rationality to many of its choices. U.S. and Western decision-makers often
dismiss this point.
Iranian logic proceeds this way. The IRI will persistently act to counter U.S. regional
influence and reach—principally to create more freedom of action for itself.162 It will
actively seek to threaten the physical security, authority, and legitimacy of its most potent regional rivals in order to enhance the prospects of it being recognized as the most
influential arbiter of regional outcomes. It will also aggressively cultivate new or enhanced relationships with neighbors and regional partners as a deterrent against foreign
(largely U.S.) interference. Finally, it seems to be actively seeking to expand its network
of meaningful relationships worldwide in order to broaden its network of security and
economic outlets.163 On this latter point, it likely perceives that its future is secure to the
extent it is indispensable to others.
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All of these in either purpose or practice bring Iran and the United States into a condition of perpetual competition and conflict. Of particular concern to the United States
and its partners is Iran’s pursuit of regional dominance over the most important outcomes and the methods it employs toward that end.
Iran is obviously engaged in aggressive power projection by proxy around the
Persian Gulf and wider Middle East region (e.g., GCC, Iran, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon,
etc.). This includes support for terrorists and paramilitaries threatening U.S. allies and
partners, and commitment to regimes whose behaviors have proven fundamentally destabilizing. Further, its cost imposing hybrid military doctrine and capability present
persistent challenges to the security of regional partners, unfettered access to and use
of the commons, and U.S./partner military freedom of action. Finally, the profoundly
destabilizing proposition of Iran as an aspiring hot or warm nuclear power challenges
foundational tenets of the American-led status quo.
In response, the United States and its partners have employed decades of countermeasures ranging from diplomacy to military preparations and operations. The first
involves economic sanctions against the Iranian Government and key Iranian individuals. The second path has been persistent positioning of U.S. military resources in and
around the region. Finally, the third track has been marked by the effort to build partner
military capacity in the region as a counterbalance to growing Iranian influence.164
To date, the U.S./partner record against Iran is mixed. Iran continues to threaten
Middle Eastern stability almost whenever and wherever it chooses. The Iranian Threat
Network (ITN)—consisting of the QF, Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security, and
Iranian foreign surrogates—is invested region-wide. Syria remains propped up by Iranian assistance.165 Iraq has fallen under Iran’s sway after a considerable Iranian investment
in its security.166 In Yemen, Iran is free-riding on and fomenting disorder along Saudi
Arabia’s southern border. Moreover, in Lebanon, Iranian-client Hezbollah continues to
handicap effective central governance in order to retain freedom of action. This last issue
is most immediately threatening to Israel.
The recent conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran’s
nuclear program clearly changes some of the U.S. calculus with respect to Iran. Many
analysts presumed that Iranian pursuit of a warm nuclear weapons capability, at a minimum, was an insurance policy against U.S. interference and an instrument for regional
intimidation. The JCPOA has presumably cooled Iranian pursuit for the time being and
has effectively extended Iran’s nuclear breakout time.167
In return, Iran will receive $60 billion in unfrozen assets.168 Iran will also gain access
to the global economy for petroleum sales and weapons purchases. Of course, the devil
is in the implementation details. For the United States and its Western allies, Iran is further away from nuclearization. However, Iran also is in the strongest position it has been
in since 1979. The degree to which expanded engagement opens the door for Iranian
moderation is an open question.
Understanding Iran and its unwavering quest for security is key. Recognizing how
Iran pursues its security is useful as well. Linking Iran’s blend of conventional and unconventional actions across the region presents U.S. decision-makers with an opportunity to see its gray zone problem more clearly. U.S. decision-making on Iran will remain
challenging well into the foreseeable future.
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RISK: MANY CHOICES—EQUALLY HIGH RISKS
The U.S.-Iran dilemma is a classic demonstration of the uncertain risk-reward tradeoffs involved in gray zone challenges. Action to counter adverse Iranian behavior—either positive or negative—opens the door to significant success in limiting the nature
and magnitude of the perceived threat from Iran. On the other hand, most actions—diplomatic engagement, military action, economic sanctions, etc.—also have the potential
to worsen or complicate American calculations.
The wager that is the JCPOA is a perfect example in this regard. Recognizing the
unlikelihood that broad international sanctions would return once lifted in accordance
with JCPOA, Iran might follow the North Korean model and serially violate the agreement terms on the margins to acquire a nuclear weapon or a near-nuclear breakout
capability. Should that occur, U.S. decision-makers would face the unpalatable prospect
of military confrontation with a nuclear-armed Iran or an uncontrolled regional nuclear
arms race. The associated security dilemma and inherent instability would make the
current standoff appear tame.
Opting against a diplomatic agreement, the United States may have attempted to
maintain a sanctions regime. However, international participation and discipline with
respect to sanctions would have been suspect. Continued Iranian pursuit of some nuclear capability likely would have engendered increased U.S. coercive military actions
and economic measures against Iran. This time, however, with a more limited number
of outside participants.
At a minimum, accepting this course would put the United States, a more limited
number of partners, and Iran on a collision course toward hazardous escalation. While
American conventional military capability would likely prevail tactically and operationally, U.S. coercive military operations would not be cost-free strategically. They may occur absent the consent of the international community, and there is a significant chance
the region would end up with similar outcomes and risks as those outlined earlier.
Additionally, any more aggressive moves toward limiting Iranian freedom of action
region-wide hazards horizontal escalation in areas where Iran activates its network of
proxies against U.S. interests. Another concern is asymmetric escalation in theater where
the Iranians engage in hybrid, cost-imposing military action inside the narrow confines
of the Persian Gulf. Both courses of action rapidly begin to raise costs and increase risks
for the United States. Thus, in many cases, the hazards associated with both a specific
action or a level of inaction appear to be equally high and unpalatable. Enter the next
phase of U.S.-Iranian gray zone competition.
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IX. THE SCORPION UNLEASHED – THE “BEGINNING OF HISTORY”
IN A FAILING MIDDLE EAST
“I have witnessed the tremendous energy of the masses. On this foundation, it is possible to
accomplish any task whatsoever.”
-Mao Tse-Tung169

THE CONTEXTUAL GRAY ZONE CHALLENGE
The MENA region is chronically unstable and characterized by the increasing failure of state institutions. The authority of the region’s status quo governments is under
relentless assault by motivated rejectionist forces. Arab governments in particular that
had remained reliant on traditional tools of social control have found their control fundamentally weakened.
Furthermore, the coalescing stresses of persistent conflict, political revolution, demographic change, and globalization make those tools increasingly less effective at either
inspiring or controlling populations predisposed to rejection.170 In short, MENA has entered an uncertain period of radical transformation where governments and the governed are increasingly at odds and regional disputes will have worldwide implications.
Many MENA states are important U.S. partners in maintaining a stable and secure
regional order.171 That order relies on durable political authority—a concept that is an increasingly perilous position region-wide. Given the turbulent years since the beginning
of the Arab Spring—with revolutions, near-revolutions, or contagious civil conflict in
Egypt, Libya, Syria, Iraq, Tunisia, Yemen, and Bahrain—all of the region’s conservatively governed states are at risk of sudden disruptive change. As important regional states
weaken, fail, or fracture, malevolent state and nonstate actors fill the void created by
disintegrating authority.172 The state weakness, ungoverned or under-governed areas,
and fraying social cohesion that follow are both crucibles for the emergence of violent
extremism, as well as vectors for its viral expansion.
MENA is archetypal of a “contextual” gray zone challenge in that its profound complexity derives from the incidental and not purposeful confluence of actors and forces. It
is neither traditional war where a clean and neat duality of opposing interests plays out
in armed conflict nor is it an acceptable peace ripe for routine maintenance via engagement. Instead, it presents defense and military strategists with complex multi-sided conflicts rooted in myriad origins and between actors operating at radically diverse levels of
sophistication, organization, and capability.
As suggested earlier, MENA’s menace largely originates from underlying forces that
are for the most part beyond even the most powerful states’ influence and reach. Thus,
MENA presents an even sharper break from defense convention than that suggested by
the aforementioned purposeful state-based threats. If some gray zone competition and
conflict is akin to war (as was argued at the outset), then it is accurate to say that the
United States, its allies, and its regional partners are in fact at war with MENA’s environment itself, not simply one or more of the disruptive actors operating in and from it.
For example, while malign nonstate actors (e.g., ISIL, al Qaeda, al Nusra, Hezbollah,
etc.) are manifest across the MENA region, they are not in reality the core problems.
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Instead, they are symptoms of a more fundamental regional malady. Effectively addressing one challenge—even the most prominent—will likely not change the region’s
overall security trajectory. In the end, effectively weathering and containing the most
dangerous implications of MENA’s disruptive transformation is a more accurate characterization of the art of the possible.
Each gray zone challenge represents a unique and context-dependent contest for
which U.S. Government processes and tools must adapt. To date in MENA, they appear
wholly unsuited for the task. In most cases, the DoD is at the center of this challenge.
STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT – ONE BIG REGION, ONE BIG PROBLEM
In response to MENA’s dangerous volatility, the United States pursues a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach
to protect and advance core U.S. interStrategic Insights—The Scorpion Unleashed
ests.173 To date, however, the adopted
course of action appears not to be keep• A disordered and devolving MENA environment is fertile ground for the hybrid combinaing pace with the region’s gray zone
tion of malevolent state and nonstate actors.
challenge. In short and not unlike the
profound unpreparedness American
• MENA is archetypal of a “contextual” gray zone
decision-makers and operators expechallenge in that its profound hybridity derives
from the incidental confluence of actors and
rienced post-9/11, the centralized and
forces.
traditional approach to synchronizing
U.S. Government efforts in MENA to• The MENA region is a complex adaptive system
for which the United States will struggle for hoday is exhibiting significant limitations
listic and wholly rational responses. Unintended
as well.
consequences and uncontrollable forces militate
U.S. efforts have taken different
against U.S. strategic coherence. U.S. decisionforms in different countries. However,
makers face unsatisfying choices, such as endthe U.S. Government has synchroless counterterrorism, questionable partnerships
and expedient damage control.
nized its efforts consistently across the
region. Consistency, however, does
• Risks associated with future U.S. action or inacnot necessarily connote effectiveness.
tion are unclear but still daunting; both have already proven unsatisfying.
Broadly, the United States has sought
capable partners to support its efforts.
Yemen, Libya, Syria, and Iraq provide
examples of how the United States has
acted through partners. Where legally
able, the United States supplemented its partner capacity building efforts with standoff
precision strikes against Islamist threats in the region.
A survey of some U.S. efforts in the following example countries illustrates the
strengths and limitations of the American approach to date. The limitations draw attention to how the U.S. Government has struggled to adapt its policies, plans, and operations to MENA’s unique gray zone challenges.
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Yemen.
In Yemen, the United States partnered with the Government of President Ali Abdullah Saleh as part of a counterterrorism strategy against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. When Arab Spring protests began in 2011, the United States changed its position.
After supporting a government transition, the United States backed Yemen’s Vice President, Abd Rabduh Mansour Hadi, a replacement for Saleh.
Although the Yemeni President changed, U.S. counterterrorism policy did not.174 After Houthi rebels from northern Yemen caused President Hadi to flee Yemen, the United
States shifted its support to the Saudi-led coalition conducting combat operations in the
eastern part of the country. The central theme of the U.S. support to the Saudi coalition
was, and remains, counterterrorism.175 In addition, while the coalition persists in conducting traditional military operations, within the chaos of current day Yemen, Islamic
militants have multiplied and a central Yemeni government is far from re-establishing
its authority.
Libya.
In Libya, the United States began Operation ODYSSEY DAWN in March of 2011. The
operation focused on “protecting innocent civilians in Libya and holding the Qaddafi
regime accountable.”176 Following ODYSSEY DAWN and NATO’s Operation UNIFIED
PROTECTOR, the Qaddafi regime collapsed.
In the aftermath, the United States re-established its embassy and supported Libya’s
Transitional National Council in its efforts to create a post-Qaddafi government.177 With
the deaths of U.S. Ambassador Chris Stevens and three other Americans on September
11, 2012, U.S. efforts waned. Largely confined to the embassy, U.S. activities in Libya
have concentrated on assisting Libya’s General National Congress (GNC) Government.
Following a breakdown of the Libyan GNC Government and a collapse of security,
the United States evacuated its embassy in 2014.178 Following the evacuation, the United
States has supported conflict resolution between Libya’s two competing governments—
the GNC and the House of Representatives (HoR). In the interim, Libya’s security situation has worsened and allowed Libya to become a haven for Islamic fighters, including
a North African branch of ISIL.179
Syria.
Syria presents another complex gray zone challenge. Syria still possesses a central
government and has the overt support of both Russia and Iran. However, Bashar alAssad’s regime has lost control of large sections of the country to Islamist opposition
forces of various stripes, and its defense of regime territory has created entrenched and
metastasizing resistance to its rule. Assad’s methods and allies have mobilized an uncoordinated, multi-nodal, and conflicted universe of Islamic opposition forces.180 These
capable groups—representing myriad points on the Islamist spectrum—are all actively
vying with the Syrian Government and each other for a stake in the post-Assad era.
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Through much of the course of the Syrian civil war, President Obama has maintained
the position that Syria’s future stability requires al-Assad’s removal.181 Unfortunately,
the resiliency of the Syrian regime has prevented the realization of an acceptable political solution to the crisis. Meanwhile, large portions of Syria (and Iraq) are now under the
control of the regime’s most capable opponent—ISIL. Islamic State territory between the
two countries represents the world’s largest sanctuary for Islamic militants. Moreover,
the United States finds itself tacitly operating against and on behalf of the Syrian regime
as it conducts air and special operations actions against ISIL in both Syria and Iraq.
Iraq.
Finally, U.S. policymakers did not anticipate Iraq’s current dysfunction.182 As both
the deliberate instrument of Iraq’s 2003 collapse and with many post-collapse options
and tools at its disposal, the United States can arguably claim some of the credit for
Iraq’s emergent gray zone threat.
After withdrawing combat forces from Iraq in 2011, the United States remained somewhat passive while Iraq’s Government became increasingly sectarian. Former Prime
Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s actions created the conditions for the rapid re-mobilization of
sectarian forces in Iraq.183 Sunni militants used grievances against Iraq’s Shi’a dominated
government as an ISIL recruitment tool. As in the case of Syria, Iraq ultimately lost significant territory to ISIL and has yet to demonstrate both consistent and self-sustaining
means to recapture it.184 Consequently, as a function of its wider counter-ISIL campaign,
the United States deployed several thousand U.S. forces in and around Iraq to train and
support Iraqi forces, conduct precision military strikes, and conduct a limited number of
discrete ground-based military operations.
Thus, both Iraq and Syria are now active fronts in the U.S. counter-ISIL campaign.
Of the military instruments employed, U.S. air operations are the most robust. To date,
counter-ISIL actions in Iraq are of a higher priority than those in Syria. The United
States has conducted over half of its counter-ISIL airstrikes against over 16,000 targets
inside Iraq’s borders.185 Despite stepped up U.S. efforts against ISIL, the United States
remains wholly dependent on others—Iraq, moderate Sunni opposition groups, regional allies, etc.—to eliminate ISIL sanctuaries. To date, this approach has fallen short of
expectations.
The MENA region will remain a challenge for the United States. The region represents a kaleidoscope of context-dependent challenges. Each MENA country and challenge can shift from manageable to unmanageable in relative short order. U.S. partners
in one country or against one specific challenge may be adversaries in other instances.
Escalation from stability to violence can occur rapidly. Due to shifting interests and
power relationships in the region, the United States will experience uncertain partnerships and even more uncertain outcomes in MENA for some time.
CURRENT U.S. APPROACH—“WHACK-A-MOLE” 2.0?
This report concludes that U.S. defense challenges in the MENA region are products
of perspective and approach. The former stems from an inadequate or unsophisticated
frame for understanding the more fundamental regional challenges and their impact on
59

DoD decision-making. In addition, the latter relates to the near-exclusive U.S. reliance
on standoff and proxy action for durable results. In both cases, it is clear U.S. Government decision-making on the issues at hand can and must improve.
In each case outlined previously, U.S. policy has been non-predictive and inadequately prescriptive. The United States has yet to diagnose appropriately the scope and
nature of its expanding MENA challenge outside of the simplistic counter-terror model
that has driven U.S. policy since 9/11. MENA represents a malignant pan-regional crisis of authority. It presents U.S. decision-makers with a level of volatility, uncertainty,
complexity, and ambiguity that far surpass that of the other archetypes covered in this
report.
MENA will not conform neatly to the threat and response frames that have informed
U.S. defense strategy to date. It is a violent, indeterminate, and potentially intractable
social science problem with military dimensions. It is not a neat military science problem
with an easily definable beginning and end.
To date, failures of imagination, anticipation, and remediation plague the U.S.MENA strategy; U.S. decision-makers have failed to imagine the worst possible outcomes of disintegrating political authority. They have failed to anticipate the virulence
of the darkest forces at work in the region, let loose by disintegrating authority. Finally,
they have failed to act under a region-wide strategic design that recognizes the transformational character of the environment.
Consequently, purposeful MENA rejectionists have exploited the region’s strategic
context, the U.S. approach to that context, and the U.S. tools applied in that approach to
pursue their ends. The results are predictable: circumstances in Yemen, Libya, Iraq, and
Syria are worse and, thus far, stable states like those of the GCC and Jordan are more
at risk.
U.S. preferences for standoff or over-the-horizon strike have yet to demonstrate a
significant decrease in the extremist threat within or outside the region. For example, the
target lists and target summaries associated with air operations to counter ISIL—dubbed
Operation INHERENT RESOLVE (OIR)—provide an easily quantifiable reference for
the number of key leaders, vehicles, buildings, and infrastructure attacked.186 However,
they do not provide meaningful insights to the overall effectiveness of the campaign
against a somewhat formless idea-based threat. They provide output vice outcome measures of performance—providing potentially meaningless context-free metrics and the
potential for limitless interpretations. In reality, the effectiveness of OIR airstrikes will
be determined when Islamic militants experience measurable setbacks.
A second and wholly understandable U.S. preference for others to do the heavy lifting to secure the region is laudable but inadequate. In Iraq, for example, the United
States has expedited weapons sales and deliveries bound for the Iraqi Security Forces
(ISF). U.S. forces in Iraq have the primary mission of training Iraqi forces so that the ISF
can defeat ISIL. Unfortunately, the ISF has yet to begin a major operation against ISIL, although there is some indication that operations to retake Mosul will conclude in 2016.187
In Syria, the United States tried to train moderate opposition groups but failed to
produce a force capable of having any effect inside the country.188 After helping to overthrow Qaddafi in Libya, the United States tried to build a capable partner security force
but failed.189 In Yemen, the United States had supported the Yemeni security forces with
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hundreds of millions of dollars of assistance.190 When Yemen collapsed, the United States
shifted to expedited support for the Saudi-led GCC coalition. In all four cases, partner
security forces were unable to establish or extend control consistent with U.S. interests.
Predictably, in all cases, U.S. efforts foundered.
U.S. GOVERNMENT IN ACTION—THE ISIL EXAMPLE
Since neither airstrikes nor security force assistance seems to be the antidote for MENA’s complex security challenges, the United States has bolstered its security efforts
with a renewed whole-of-government approach. The Islamic State, representing one of
the most serious threats to security in the region, provides a good example of the current
U.S. approach.
ISIL grew from the vacuum created by ineffective governance, institutional failure,
and sectarian violence in Iraq and Syria. ISIL is first a rejectionist movement that liberally employs violence as currency to create a 21st-century caliphate out of the ashes of
a failed Syria and Iraq. To date, ISIL has secured thousands of square miles of territory,
terrorized populations, and created an oppressive and intolerant Islamic proto-state in
the strategic heart of the Middle East.191
Until mid-2014, ISIL’s violent expansion seemed to be a peripheral threat to U.S.
allies and interests in the region. By 2015, ISIL’s demonstrated reach, influence, and endurance saw it rise in prominence within policymaking circles as an urgent threat to U.S.
national security.192 The U.S. Government has since sought ISIL’s defeat by “harnessing
all elements of American power, across our government—military, intelligence, diplomatic, economic, development, and… [U.S.] values.”193 Toward that end, the United
States leads a 60-plus nation coalition and follows a strategy based on nine LOEs:194
• Supporting effective governance in Iraq
• Denying ISIL safe haven through airstrikes195
• Building partner capacity for partner militaries to defeat ISIL196
• Enhancing intelligence collection to better target ISIL
• Disrupting ISIL’s finances
• Exposing ISIL’s true nature to undermine its message
• Disrupting the flow of foreign fighters
• Protecting the U.S. homeland
• Humanitarian support to displaced populations in Iraq and Syria
The counter-ISIL campaign and its LOEs are naturally long-term propositions. Unfortunately, ISIL’s demonstrated ability to defy geographical limitations to inspire recent high-profile attacks indicates that the U.S. strategy will not necessarily limit ISIL’s
capability for strategic-level harm in the near-term.
As patience may expire well-before the strategy bears fruit, strategic innovation with
respect to ISIL, and all of the various symptomatic challenges of MENA devolution is
in order. Innovation may emerge from a more sophisticated U.S. diagnosis of the underlying MENA-wide crisis of governance and the yawning gaps in the secure exercise
of political authority across the region. First raised in the wake of 9/11, the challenge
of un-governance and under-governance remains fertile soil for endemic insecurity. To
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the extent that this issue grows worse, more complex and virulent rejectionist forces are
likely to emerge.
Further, innovation may also come from better integration of all the tools at the disposal of U.S. and partner leaders. Gray zone threats in the 21st century are first hybrid
challenges, liberally mixing hazards across functions and domains. Responses to them
should also be hybrid in character. In the case of the United States, this implies new approaches that seamlessly blend effects from the various instruments of national power.
RISK—HIGH, TRENDING MUCH HIGHER
The United States has lost its decision-space-advantage in the MENA region. U.S.
defense decision-making frames and processes are simply no match for MENA’s diverse
security challenges and their profound complexity. The two features combined create an
uncertain strategic planning environment that highlights in sharp relief the risk dilemmas presented by both action and inaction as they relate to the region. MENA is gray
precisely because it is impossible to identify, focus on, and pace against a well-defined
and manageable set of defense-relevant challenges. In MENA, the environment and the
trends driving it are in fact the principal adversaries.
Complexity in the MENA region means that any U.S. action has the potential to
create even greater challenges for the United States and its partners. Further, the wide
diversity of threat types makes first order prioritization challenging for senior decisionmakers. MENA boasts a potential nuclear power with a penchant for destabilizing regional proxy wars; a series of state-killing civil conflicts; myriad extremist groups that
emerge from and thrive on endemic regional instability; and generalized rejectionist
trends that fast undermine the authority and reach of even the region’s most capable
states. Action against one or more of these will inevitably affect the nature and magnitude of risk associated with others.
The 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq is the first of many clear examples in this regard.
In large measure, there is an expert consensus that the United States is where it is in Iraq
and Syria precisely because of the deliberate collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime.197 On
a smaller scale, Libya and Yemen also demonstrate the risk of U.S. action. In a desire to
improve its position, U.S. actions contributed to a collapse of both Libya and Yemen.
This collapse led to a security vacuum followed by rampant instability.
A newfound U.S. Government appreciation of the risks of action have led it at times
to embrace inaction or limited action in the region. In Syria, many perceive that U.S.
inaction allowed the situation to worsen.198 Further, it opened new unhelpful operating
space for U.S. adversaries. Russia and Iran, for example, are perceived to have seized
on U.S. hesitation to more actively aid the Assad regime.199 Similarly, many argue that
American passivity in the face of increasing violence and instability in Iraq between
2010-2014 highlight the hazards of inaction as well. During that period, a more assertive U.S. commitment may have limited ISIL operating space and prevented its de facto
control over large areas of Iraqi territory.200
MENA’s complexity combined with the perception of low returns on heavy U.S. regional investment since 2001 have seen American policy purposefully limit U.S. regional
commitment. Consequently, risk has likely increased in some respects; how much and
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to what end is actually uncertain. What is clear—absent unifying U.S. leadership—is
that the region’s nations and competing interest groups will act according to naked selfinterest. For example, in Libya, different Gulf States fund opposing militias. Syria, Saudi
Arabia, Iran, Russia, and Turkey act independently to advance a narrow and immediate
security-based agenda—often in conflict with one another and counter to U.S. interests.
As in the case of action, inaction has its own unique set of costs. U.S. Government
inaction hazards sending conflicting signals to friends, neutrals, and adversaries alike.
It flirts with unacceptable and irreparable loss occurring in the absence of U.S. efforts to
prevent it. Finally, it cedes initiative to purposeful adversaries and contextual circumstances, both of which by choice or happenstance are unwilling to account for American
preferences and thus, create greater risk for U.S. leaders to consider.
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X. THE ENDANGERED EAGLE—THE UNITED STATES
AS A GRAY ZONE ACTOR
“Speak softly, and carry a big stick.”

-Theodore Roosevelt201

INNOVATION IN THE GRAY ZONE: 20TH CENTURY
COMPETITION AND CONFLICT
Theodore Roosevelt is credited with saying, “In any moment of decision, the best
thing you can do is the right thing, the next best thing is the wrong thing, and the worst
thing you can do is nothing.”202 Roosevelt’s perspective sheds some light on two important aspects of this report.
The first is the report’s emphatic opening claim that the United States was once the
world’s consummate gray zone competitor. Roosevelt was after all the first champion
of U.S. global activism and that activism occurred before the United States possessed
the comprehensive cross-domain advantages vis-à-vis other advantages it later enjoyed.
Thus, to succeed, it had to rely on alternative gray zone approaches to realize its early aspirations for global power. The second is a reminder to current day decision-makers that
paralysis in the face of gray zone competition is likely fatal from a strategic perspective.
In context, Roosevelt’s quote reflects a time when the United States began its hard
won transformation from an isolationist and continental power to an expanding global
power. Roosevelt is the first U.S. President credited with recognizing American potential as a great power and acting with purpose to achieve significant gains toward that
end. The key quality that enabled Roosevelt’s effective stewardship of rising U.S. influence was his decisiveness. His decisive nature aggressively set the tone for a new era of
exploding U.S. global competitiveness at the very time that opportunities existed for it
to thrive.
Since the time of Roosevelt and until the end of the Cold War, history is rife with
examples of significant U.S. offensive and defensive action in the gray zone. Indeed, the
current U.S. global position is largely a product of past American gray zone success.
Today, however, the predator is the prey in this regard. Though American history is
replete with examples of bold U.S. action in the face of imperfect strategic choices, there
is a palpable reluctance to act boldly or otherwise in the face of gray zone challenges
because of the presence of imperfection. An examination of the events of the last century—specifically, the actions of the United States as a gray zone competitor—may be
instructive for current policymakers and defense professionals. Fighting or campaigning
effectively in the gray zone may require some significant re-appreciation of the United
States’ significant gray zone roots.
The Great White Fleet, the Panama Canal, and Dollar Diplomacy.
Much like today, the world at the turn of the 20th century was a marketplace for
interstate competition between rising and declining powers, each vying for a degree of
control over major outcomes in support of their national interests. Great Britain stood
as the sole global superpower, its empire comprised approximately one-quarter of the
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Earth’s land area and nearly one-fifth of its population.203 Other great European powers
included Germany, Russia, France, and Spain. It was during this time that Japan and the
United States began holding larger, global aspirations as well.
This study is defense-focused. However, as this study acknowledges early on, gray
zone threats are not confined to the military sphere alone. The same was true for early
20th-century great powers. They faced their own unique blend of threats that combined
military, diplomatic, economic, and informational pressures. Therefore, it is within this
strategic context that the United States first learned to compete effectively in the gray
zone against its most capable opponents.
Terms like “gunboat diplomacy” and “dollar diplomacy” accurately capture the gray
zone approach toward expanding American influence in the early 1900s. It was—as it
is now with purposeful U.S. gray zone competitors—all about skillfully integrating and
applying all of the tools at its disposal effectively to generate meaningful advantage visà-vis opponents.
One example includes the “Great
White Fleet,” the significant naval
Strategic Insights—The Endangered Eagle
build-up during the Roosevelt Administration that enabled the United States
• The United States has a long history as the
to employ naval power to secure its
premier global gray zone competitor.
interests with newfound global reach.
• Cold War policies provided the framework
Additionally, Roosevelt’s decision to
for and enabled persistent gray zone comsail a fleet of 16 battleships around the
petition to secure vital U.S. interests.
world between December 1907 and
February 1909 sent a strong message
• The United States is now in competition
to potential adversaries regarding U.S.
with actors who are using methods it pre204
viously mastered and employed to achieve
naval expeditionary capability.
great power status.
The construction of the Panama Canal provides another example of U.S.
• The DoD is in a unique position to “lead up”
skill in pursuing its interests via gray
and help restore a U.S. competitive edge
zone activity. In 1901 when Colombia
against gray zone threats and challenges.
balked at U.S. plans for a canal through
Colombian-controlled Panama, the
United States privately encouraged a
revolution then openly backed it financially and militarily—principally via naval blockade. The Panamanian revolt succeeded largely because Colombia was unwilling to challenge the U.S. blockade and risk open war with the United States. Ultimately, the new
Panamanian Government negotiated with the United States, extending to it control of
what would become the Panama Canal Zone.205 The opening of the canal in 1914 instantly changed the global economy and vastly increased U.S. ability to project economic and
military power worldwide.
In the wake of Roosevelt’s military expansion and as the U.S. economy grew, the Taft
Administration (1909-1913) exploited both military and economic power to continue
securing U.S. interests abroad. The United States invested heavily in Latin America and
East Asia and backed up its investments with military might. This not only increased
the economic reach of the United States, it also prevented other world powers from
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encroaching on important U.S.-dominated markets. This brand of “dollar diplomacy”
was yet another intentional approach by the U.S. Government to expand influence and
gain advantages over competitors in world markets.206 Moreover, this approach largely
occurred in the gray space that is the subject of this report.
World Wars and the Great Depression.
The period between 1917 and 1945 included two world wars and the Great Depression. There was not a great deal of gray associated with the world wars. There was,
however, a great deal of gray in U.S. activity before, after, and between the wars.
Indeed, it was through sophisticated gray zone methods that the United States was
able to consolidate and capitalize on its wartime gains and expand U.S. influence through
effective competition well below the threshold of major war. For example, Woodrow
Wilson’s effort to establish the League of Nations in 1920 was an early attempt at establishing an American-led global status quo. Wilson was ahead of his time, as the idea of
a U.S.-led, global order dominated successive presidential administrations since 1945.
It was only after the Allied victory in World War II that the world fully recognized
the United States as a global superpower. Immediately after the War, the United States
began constructing the very world order ultimately credited with countering and defeating aggressive Soviet expansion. The Soviet Union was, of course, a rival superpower. It
also sought to capitalize on its post-war gains through skillful gray zone maneuvering.
At the onset of the post-war, bi-polar rivalry between the two nuclear superpowers triggered perhaps the most dangerous period of gray zone competition in modern history.
The Cold War—The United States on the Cutting Edge of the Gray Zone.
In the aftermath of World War II, the United States took a leading role in establishing
the UN and the Bretton Woods economic system. This defined the rules of international
relations, competition, trade, and commerce for 70 years. Within this framework, two
key internal American policy initiatives helped set up long-term U.S. Cold War success.
The 1947 National Security Act and the policy of containment combined to provide
the framework under which the United States pursued, advanced, and secured its most
vital interests for the duration of the Cold War. The containment strategy and the institutions and tools that emerged from the National Security Act enabled a consistency of
U.S. purpose and action over the course of nine presidential administrations. Although
the United States applied this consistency of purpose and action against a single dominant threat during the Cold War, the circumstances under which American leaders employed it varied significantly over time.
The National Security Act, signed into law by President Harry Truman, amounted
to a complete overhaul of the U.S. national security apparatus. It established the President’s National Security Council (NSC) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). It
established the U.S. Air Force (USAF) as a separate military service and merged the Department of War (renamed Department of the Army) with the Department of the Navy
into an overarching National Military Establishment (NME).
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An amendment to the act in 1949 renamed the NME to the DoD, further unifying the
military services. In addition to creating better unity among the American armed forces,
the act centralized national security policy development and decision-making under the
NSC and integrated the nation’s intelligence gathering capability under the CIA.
The policy and authorities established through the National Security Act empowered
U.S. leaders to better understand and address contemporary challenges. Further, the act
allowed U.S. leaders to make timely policy decisions and take action in a unified manner
against a broadly acknowledged, commonly defined, and widely understood threat to
the United States and its partners within the most appropriate decision-making context.
Containment of Soviet ambition as a concept began with George Kennan’s now
famous 1946 cable from Moscow.207 Kennan’s “long telegram,” later published anonymously in Foreign Affairs, outlined a policy of containing inevitable Soviet expansion
with Western political, military, and economic instruments. At the time, Kennan’s policy
received criticism for being both too defensive in nature and for failing to differentiate
between vital and peripheral U.S. interests.208
By 1950, Paul Nitze revised Kennan’s containment policy and turned it into a national counter-Soviet strategy with National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68). NSC-68
provided the American President with a comprehensive look at the threat posed by
the Soviet Union and offered various containment options for his ultimate approval.
NSC-68 became a charter for significant increases in military spending, economic and
industrial investment, and diplomatic engagement and alliances.209
The key decisions associated with NSC-68 shaped the global landscape for the next
40 years. Importantly, pursuit of containment forced the United States to navigate the
gray zone by skillfully choosing when, where, and how to act in a manner that contained
the most dangerous or destabilizing Soviet activities while still remaining short of Soviet
redlines that could trigger open war.
U.S. Cold War strategy included a wide range of actions. These included elaborate
information campaigns designed to expose the Soviet Union’s worst intentions and
abuses; economic warfare using embargos and sanctions to deny Soviet Bloc nations
from Western technology, goods, and services; and a relentless military build-up of conventional and nuclear capabilities. Even large-scale wars on the periphery in Korea and
Vietnam were key components of U.S. containment policy. All of these actions demonstrated a deep U.S. commitment to protect, at great cost, the post-war order it had
established.
Unsurprisingly, the National Security Act further allowed for the legal conduct of
covert action under the CIA’s control. Congress passed a number of subsequent statutory actions to provide even greater explicit legal support and funding for covert activities. They provided the President with the authority to authorize covert action that was
“necessary to support identifiable foreign policy objectives . . . and is important to the
national security of the United States.”210 Through these and other related authorities,
the U.S. Government continued to conduct warlike operations outside the normal scope
of conventional warfare throughout the Cold War.
It is also notable that U.S. SOF began during the Cold War. SOF gave the United
States a capability for low visibility and covert military operations that could, if necessary, avoid attribution to the U.S. Government or supported nations. The unconven67

tional warfare competency in particular focused on the preparation and employment
of proxy forces to achieve discrete U.S. national policy objectives. Today, SOF’s original
function endures, as it is still required to “maintain and advance…capabilities for extending U.S. reach into denied areas and uncertain environments…by conducting lowvisibility operations.”211
As the Cold War progressed, the cyber domain emerged as an important theater of
competition and conflict. Indeed, the United States was the first to define both the cyber
playing field and the scope of potential gray zone competition and conflict within it.
U.S. gray zone cyber activities date to at least 1982 with the mysterious explosion of a
Soviet oil pipeline. The CIA was later identified as the culprit. Many analysts presume
that the agency planted a “logic bomb” in the pipeline’s control system.212 That was 25
years before the “Stuxnet” operation that successfully slowed Iran’s nuclear weapons
development program.213
RISK—GET BACK IN THE GAME OR GET ON THE SIDELINES
Great power competition in the 21st century—like that of the 19th and 20th centuries—is a contact sport. The rules and conventions change but effectively competing is
the only way to thrive and win. The Cold War, in particular, is a useful reminder of the
need to compete.
There was a consistency of purpose at the highest levels of U.S. decision-making
through nine presidential administrations. That consistency of purpose flowed from the
foundation laid in NSC-68. Containment was the U.S. gray zone vessel for responding to
the Soviet threat and it endured as an animating concept for more than 40 years.
Throughout the Cold War—operating according to the conventions of containment—
the United States creatively employed all of its resources in a gray zone campaign to
limit Soviet freedom of maneuver, force Soviet decision-makers into unfavorable asymmetric competitions, and, ultimately, defeat Soviet power more by endurance, guile,
and cost imposition than brute force.214 Victory in the Cold War was a singular U.S.
achievement.
There were dangerous redlines and trip wires along the way. Nuclear and conventional miscalculations, for example, were ever-present prospects. However, U.S. decision-makers skillfully avoided both. The United States and Soviet Union fought wars
within the Cold War context, but never against one another directly. Instead, wars in
Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan became proxy battlefields for one or the other to
bloody their competitor without engendering the very high cost of direct confrontation.
The United States is now a victim of many of the very tools that enabled its own past
success. The U.S.-led post-Cold War order is under persistent assault from revisionist
and rejectionist forces that are fast redefining the terms, character, and scope of consequential competition and conflict.
Purposeful revisionist actors are manipulating and maneuvering in the information
sphere.215 They are using political agitation and commercial activity as weapons. They
often act through proxies. When they act directly, they innovatively employ civilian or
law enforcement assets, intelligence, special operations, cyber, and space capabilities
to change circumstances in their favor under the long the shadow of their more traditional military reach. They skirt redlines and sometimes cross them. However, they do
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so conscious that the United States has a very low tolerance for the uncertainty of risk.
In outline, this sounds remarkably similar to the American approach to the Cold War.
Other actors exploit the unrestricted maneuver space afforded by prolific rejection of
traditional authority in key regions of the world. They often operate in the margins or alternate between legitimate and illegitimate motives and methods. They benefit from the
incidental confluence of often-unconnected environmental trends. Consequently, they
do not necessarily gray individually but instead blend into an indistinguishable gray
whole when they combine with others and their environment.
In response to these broad trends in international security, the choices confronting
U.S. decision-makers are imperfect at best. Faced with wicked strategic planning dilemmas and imperfect responses to them, U.S. decision-makers have recently erred on the
side of caution. 216 This study finds that excessive caution appears at best to be a flawed
strategic design. The past is prologue in this regard.
U.S. strategic leaders generally, and DoD leadership specifically, should take three
cues from the United States’ gray zone past. First, identify and define the principal character of the most urgent defense-relevant threats to core U.S. interests. There are many
threats to American interests; those emerging from the gray zone do not always appear
defense-centric at first. However, any response to them will all have important defense
components.
Second, design a viable and adaptive strategic approach to confront, defeat, or manage those threats at acceptable levels of risk. Here, the DoD will be one of many important players in wider U.S. Government responses. The DoD can, however, assume that
it will be responsible for leading, following, or underwriting all U.S. counter-gray zone
responses. In addition, its planning culture may push it ahead of its counterparts in
other U.S. Government agencies in taking on the gray zone challenge.
Finally, create a corporate culture that supports mechanisms and operational tools
that will allow for effective campaigning against gray zone challenges. This requirement
spans responsibilities for strategy development, military planning, and operational execution. If there is one overarching lesson from past experience, it is that understanding the competitive landscape, designing adaptable courses through that terrain toward
strategic objectives, and persistently operating with purpose in pursuit of those ends are
essential components of success.
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Study Outcomes

71

XI. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The U.S. Army War College study team arrived at a finite set of key findings and
recommendations. These represent the team’s most salient insights on how the DoD
might consider adapting to its newly recognized gray zone challenge set. In many cases,
both the findings and recommendations are statements of principle. The study team
suggests that these principles will provide senior defense leadership with touchstones
for deeper examination over the forthcoming year.
Policy and Strategy
The findings and recommendations are broken into two major categoFindingsries. The first set covers national- and
• There is no common perception of the nadepartment-level policy and strategy.
ture, character, or hazard associated with
It represents the study team’s judgthe gray zone or its individual threats and
ments on issues that guide key DoD
challenges.
decisions vis-à-vis gray zone competition and conflict at the highest levels
• There is significant asymmetry in risk perof the department. The second set conceptions between the United States, its partners, and their principal gray zone advercerns insights on operational plans and
saries and competitors.
military capabilities. These provide the
study team’s best judgments on issues
• There is neither an animating grand strataffecting the employment of U.S. miliegy nor “campaign-like” charter to guide
tary capabilities in gray zone environU.S. defense efforts against specific gray
ments and against specific gray zone
zone challenges.
challenges.
RecommendationsThis report does not attempt to
offer a specific strategic approach to
• The DoD should develop a common, compelling, and adaptive strategic picture of the
any of the four competitor archetypes.
range of gray zone threats and their associRather, the upcoming findings and recated hazards.
ommendations represent generalizable
response principles that the team be• The DoD should “lead up” and develop aclieves capture the nature of gray zone
tionable and classified strategic approachdemand regardless of origin and the
es to discrete gray zone challenges and
tools and boundaries associated with
challengers.
the broad waterfront of available gray
zone responses.
POLICY AND STRATEGY
The following findings and recommendations provide ways for the DoD and national security policymakers to formulate strategic-level direction as it applies to gray
zone competition and conflict. These findings should guide high-level U.S. Government
deliberations on leadership and coordination of future U.S. gray zone campaigning.
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Finding 1: There is no common perception of the nature, character, or hazard
associated with the gray zone or its individual threats and challenges.
To date, the DoD has adhered to assumptions and planning perspectives that do not
fully account for the gray zone as the study team perceives it to be now and for some
time to come. When corporate U.S. Government convention aligns poorly with reality,
strategy development and military planning will suffer. This is currently true for the
U.S. response to gray zone competition and conflict. Consequently, there are real gaps
in strategic design, deliberate plans, and defense capabilities as they apply to operating and succeeding in gray zone environments. In short, the United States has ceded
initiative and advantage to gray zone competitors and competitive forces because of a
corporate failure to grasp the totality of the challenges at hand.
The gray zone is not a specific defense and military challenge with well-defined parameters and boundaries. Instead, it is clear recognition of a universe of challenges lying in what amounts to conceptual dead space in strategy development and strategic
planning. This dead space exists from the highest levels of the U.S. national security
community to deep into the Pentagon’s strategy and planning processes. Thus, what
specifically gray zone challenges are is less important than where they are conceptually
in the Pentagon’s hierarchy of planning priorities.
In reality, the gray zone and its constituent challenges exist in parallel to the DoD’s
preferred “threatscape” and, thus, are never fully accounted for in defense strategy and
planning. For example, three of four competitor archetypes covered in this report are
represented in the “4 plus 1” threat construct outlined in the The National Military Strategy.217 They made that particular 4 plus 1 list primarily because of their perceived hostility or potential hostility to U.S. interests and their assumed ability to threaten those
interests with military action. In the study team’s view, this is a prudent but insufficient
and overly conventional perspective on the actual hazards of Chinese, Russian, and Iranian revisionist activities.
Further, according to the Pentagon, the “plus 1” includes VEOs like ISIL and al Qaeda.218 From the study team’s perspective, that is an excessively narrow interpretation
of the defense and military implications of what is likely a more generalized trend toward rejectionism and its attendant threat to responsible political authority and security
worldwide.
From a conventional U.S. defense perspective, the aforementioned revisionists represent contingency pacers and the latter rejectionists, near-term targets for elimination.
This study suggests the reality is quite different. Revisionist China, Russia, and Iran, for
example, are actively operating now against U.S. interests in deliberate campaign-like
ways. The absence of a similar campaign-like U.S. approach in response opens even
greater operating space for them to pursue and advance their interests. As a consequence, the United States hazards suffering warlike losses in the face of on-going gray
zone competition.
Likewise, the recognizable manifestations of gray zone rejectionism are symptoms
of a much broader systemic condition. In all likelihood, that condition will persistently
spawn additional—more complex—challenges as grievance and hostile activism become increasingly net-centric. The implications of this for the DoD are significant and
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will not be confined to counterterrorism. To be sure, the United States will no doubt
face a persistent terrorist challenge. However, other forms of organized violence within
and between important states and rival populations are an obvious prospect as well. It
would be irresponsible not to recognize, understand, and account for the widest possible number of pacing conditions that might emerge as a result.
Finding 2: There is significant asymmetry in risk perceptions between the United
States, its partners, and their principal gray zone adversaries and competitors.
The study team found a broad consensus on the subject of U.S.-competitor risk perceptions.219 In brief, U.S. decision-makers are widely perceived as hypersensitive to the
hazards associated with potential escalation and as a result are more conservative in
response to gray zone competition and conflict. An inadequate understanding of countervailing competitor redlines generates paralysis because U.S. decision-makers automatically perceive the risk of both inaction and action to be very high. As a result, they
have been more likely to choose not to act and thereby defer the associated risk to either
a more politically agreeable or a strategically unambiguous time. There is an operative
presumption in this also that the situation may resolve itself before American intervention is unavoidable.
U.S. competitors, on the other hand, are perceived to be much more effective at calculated risk-taking. They persistently exploit U.S. risk sensitivity to probe for and seize
opportunities. They engage in both gradualism and bold action.220 Moreover, in both
instances, their perception of U.S. risk-aversion, often confirmed by U.S. inaction, appears to encourage them to pursue bolder and more aggressive gray zone activities. The
results of this apparent asymmetry of risk-perception are predictable—loss of initiative,
ceded control over interests or territory, and a position of general disadvantage in the
face of aggressive gray zone competition.221
Recommendation: The DoD should develop a common, compelling, and adaptive
strategic picture of the range of gray zone threats and their associated hazards.
Because gray zone competition and conflict sit uncomfortably between traditional
conceptions of war and peace, policymakers and military strategists need new or newly
calibrated lenses to assess demand, design strategy, and ultimately implement meaningful actions in response. The process of doing so will require challenging the very
conventions that guided defense and national security professionals for decades.
As a start, rational strategic approaches to the broad front of gray zone challenges
require a common, compelling, and adaptive operating picture.222 This new perspective
should adequately assess the current gray zone landscape, the likeliest future trajectory
of its constituent threats, and the prospects for sharp deviations from current trends that
might trigger a fundamental defense reorientation. This perspective cannot be insular
and must account for the widest possible view points from the U.S. intelligence community and wider interagency, allies, and partners, etc.
The Cold War provides a helpful but binary example in this regard. While there
were frequent disagreements among the study team about specific methods, there was
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clear understanding of the nature of the challenge and the general strategic approach
to confront it. It is reasonable to conclude that this was a result of a commitment on the
part of the U.S. national security community and the DoD to maintain a deep and adaptive understanding of Soviet strengths and vulnerabilities. Today, the same is required
against a much more complex and transformational set of challenges.
This report’s archetypal revisionist and rejectionist actors live, exploit, and succeed
in both the dead space between artificial extremes of war and peace, as well as the extant
gaps in U.S./partner defense and military planning, concepts, and authorities. These
gaps are now significant enough that the United States has opened itself up to substantial strategic-level risk.
Thus, it is extremely important that the U.S. Government and the DoD specifically acknowledge and persistently assess the implications of the new assumptions introduced
in Section IV. Revisionist state actors are currently involved in deliberate counter-U.S.
campaigns. The archetypes outlined in this report are illustrative in this regard. Their
methods skirt and sometimes violate perceived U.S. redlines by skillfully avoiding overt
provocation and manipulating risk perceptions to create cognitive asymmetries.
These revisionists often advantage themselves in the muddy water between traditional views of war and peace to obscure their designs, methods, and intentions. Further, they modulate innovative combinations of influence, intimidation, coercion, and
aggression to exploit the prevailing interests and risk-tolerance of their opponents. They
do all of this both according to sophisticated designs, as well as through opportunism
and hostile improvisation.
Likewise, nonstate rejectionists operating in the ungoverned and inhospitable terrain
of networked hostility and failing authority are increasingly at odds with important but
often vulnerable pillars of the U.S.-led status quo. They are mostly untethered from the
traditional state system and draw strength from the corrosive effect of hyper-connectivity on traditional political authority and its mobilizing potential as a platform for physical and virtual resistance. They are gray in large measure because of how they coalesce
in time and space to present U.S. decision-makers with complex security challenges. In
addition, they ultimately present major warlike hazards and costs in the absence of a
single unifying adversary or adversarial purpose.
The contemporary environment may be a more challenging puzzle than was the
decidedly realist standoff during the Cold War. However, profound difficulty cannot
be an excuse for abdicating responsibility or ignoring requirements. The United States’
strategic approach to a multi-polar, hyper-connected environment—flush with strategically consequential actors and forces—has proven to be exceedingly vulnerable. New
approaches to that environment are in order but cannot proceed from insufficient understanding.
Finding 3: There is neither an animating grand strategy nor “campaign-like” charter
to guide U.S. defense efforts against specific gray zone challenges.
There is no grand strategy or operating charter for U.S. counter-gray zone activity.
Purposeful gray zone actors are persistently operating according to specific intent and
design against U.S. interests. Further, the contextual confluence of forces in disordered
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gray zone environments also exact costs in ways that are consistent with a powerful and
purposeful design. In both cases, U.S. responses are overly reactive.
The United States responds to each new provocation or incident as if it were either
the first or the last, whereas persistent resistance is in fact an endemic quality of all gray
zone challenges regardless of origin.223 Additionally, and consistent with Findings 1 and
2, most meaningful counter-gray zone activities occur late if at all in part because of the
absence of a thoughtful strategic-level charter.224
The United States is reactive by virtue of both recent tradition and dogged adherence to its baseline post-Cold War assumptions. In this instance, the operative tradition
is that of open and transparent national security doctrines. Meanwhile, the operative
assumption at issue is specifically concerning U.S. competitors adopting, fighting, and
losing according to American rules. Hanging onto both has placed significant limitations on U.S. readiness for gray zone competition and conflict. The first, however, has
been a particularly unhelpful obstacle to chartering a meaningful counter-gray zone
strategy. The challenge starts with the provisions of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act.
Goldwater-Nichols requires the President to routinely develop and publish a National
Security Strategy (NSS).225 Over time and especially in the post-Cold War era, the NSS
and documents like it were increasingly divorced from meaningful strategic planning as
they became more public. Now, these documents are largely equal parts boastful recordings of administration accomplishments and aspirational statements of U.S. principle.
They are certainly not deliberate and thoughtful articulations of strategy. They do not,
for example, set tangible priorities; balance the tension between ends, ways, and means;
or assess risk in a meaningful way.
In the Reagan-era and earlier, NSSs were generally classified and contained specific
strategic objectives, concepts, and priority efforts for achieving those objectives.226 However, since Goldwater-Nichols, successive administrations produced unclassified strategies. Further, most definitive statements of defense and military policy and strategy
(e.g., National Military and Defense Strategies and Quadrennial Defense Reviews) are produced for public consumption as well.
Much of this trend is attributable to the fall of the Soviet Union. Suddenly alone as
the world’s only superpower, the United States enjoyed an immense freedom of action.
The single-minded and narrowly focused Cold War strategy was now obsolete and a
new era of strategic ambiguity ensued. There was ambiguity about interests, objectives,
and threats. To be sure, there were a number of compelling threats on the defense agenda after 1991 (e.g., Iraq, North Korea, Iran, etc.) but they were naturally considered less
dangerous than the Soviet Union.
Benefiting from overwhelming military advantage, the United States could live with
this ambiguity for a time. Indeed, senior U.S. policymakers likely still prefer some ambiguity as it preserves freedom of action and leaves open the widest possible range of
options. In the face of real threats, however, too much ambiguity can be detrimental to
effective strategy development. The more ambiguous or amorphous the objectives, the
harder it is to settle on the most appropriate strategy to secure them.
In light of the environment’s complexity, the increasing polarity of U.S. domestic
politics, and the uncertainty of U.S./partner political will, U.S. decision-makers will
likely continue to value the flexibility offered by public, aspirational, and decidedly
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ambiguous policy statements. However, the types of hazards presented by the gray zone
challenges articulated herein may be changing some of that calculus.
The environment remains abundantly ambiguous in many important respects. What
is no longer ambiguous, however, are the increasingly grave threats emerging from
multiple sources of competition and conflict. Some national-level remediation is likely
at hand.
Recommendation: The DoD should “lead up” and develop actionable and classified
strategic approaches to discrete gray zone challenges and challengers.
Global leadership is no longer an assumed U.S. entitlement. If the United States does
not reassert its leadership—especially against purposeful gray zone competitors—it
hazards loss of control over the security of core interests and increasing constraints on
its global freedom of action. Therefore, it is incumbent on senior U.S. leaders to deliberately plan in a campaign-like fashion to compete for primacy and defend core interests
in the space where U.S. dominance is most at risk.
A coherent whole-of-government concept for combatting gray zone challenges would
be ideal. However, it is likely not forthcoming. Thus, the DoD should not wait for definitive national-level guidance on countering gray zone competition before thoughtfully
considering its own options.
Of course, it cannot act alone. However, with presidential approval, it can leverage
its substantial strategy development and strategic planning capacity to design coherent
and proactive strategic responses to revisionist gray zone competitors. Further, anticipating an increase in demands emerging from disintegrating authority, it would benefit
from the same level of deliberation as it relates to countering rejectionist forces as well.
In the process, the DoD should also anticipate that discrimination and ruthless prioritization will become core operating principles across the U.S. Government as resources
hold steady or become more constrained over time. Unfortunately, this will coincide
with an expansion of strategic-level hazards and attendant defense requirements. Much
of this expansion will occur in the gray zone. Thus, at a minimum, the DoD should endeavor to anticipate the tempo, demands, resources, and risks associated with the most
dangerous and disruptive manifestations of persistent gray zone competition.
Gray zone competition and conflict involve a diverse array of distinctive challenges.
Thus, any new defense strategic guidance addressing them cannot be one size fits all.
The DoD should not aspire to one plan or concept for the gray zone as a whole but,
instead, a playbook of plans and concepts tailored to the specific conditions that are
unique to each prospective threat. Those plans should be readily adaptable to changing
strategic conditions.
There are a handful of important characteristics for virtually any defense-based
approach to gray zone threats. These include adaptable deterrence, U.S. presence and
posture, mission-tailored U.S. forces, routine and targeted demonstrations of U.S. capability and will, enhanced partner resilience, cooperative security relationships, and
U.S./partner inter-operability. Where U.S. interests are most acutely threatened, DoD
strategy should focus on methods conducive to deterrence by denial, leading adversaries to conclude that no prospective concept of operation—no matter how irregular or
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innovative—will succeed in the face of U.S.-supported opposition. Toward that end and
in advance of adversary provocation, the United States should enhance partner selfreliance as a first line buffer against adversary opportunism.
Virtually all U.S. responses to gray zone threats will rely on assured regional access.
Toward this end, U.S. force posture should underwrite cold-start military operations
from within theater, as well as the contingency expansion of U.S. presence in extremis.
Loss of access that isolates partners or allies is an unacceptable outcome. Further, as U.S.
forces are globally employable assets, all posture must support both regional and extraregional requirements, including key support contracts and en route infrastructure.
In the end, DoD decision-makers should recognize that asserting U.S. leadership in
the face of persistent gray zone competition will not occur in a risk-free vacuum. Adversaries will resist and escalation will remain a persistent danger. As the DoD proceeds,
all of its proposed strategic designs should cover the latent hazards of horizontal and
vertical escalation. As it works through and arrives at insights on its gray zone challenge
set, it must also factor its major findings back into the department’s existing strategiclevel guidance.
Development of classified defense-specific charters against gray zone threats will
inevitably identify non-military concept and capability gaps. This may motivate broader
U.S. Government involvement. At a minimum, however, it will identify key vulnerabilities that require high-level U.S. Government risk mitigation. In the end, success cannot
rely on defense contributions alone. However, the DoD should be prepared to lead the
national security community to that conclusion through detailed planning. Visionary
planning symposiums like Eisenhower’s Solarium Project are one route toward designing innovative new strategies to confront the most dangerous and disruptive gray zone
threats while bringing essential non-military talent into the process.227
OPERATIONAL PLANS AND MILITARY CAPABILITIES
The following recommendations highlight some ways for the U.S. military to transform concepts, capabilities, and operations to compete better in gray zone environments.
While not the focus of this report, U.S. interagency processes may need similar enhancements to become a more viable supported and supporting arm in counter-gray zone
campaigns.
Finding 4: CCDR’s presumptive future gray zone responsibilities do not align with
their current authorities.
The geographic combatant command (GCC) CCDRs are accountable for the conditions they can touch in their area of responsibility (AOR). As such, they are on the leading edge of prospective U.S. defense responses to purposeful and contextual gray zone
competition and conflict. This study concludes that gray zone competitors are in fact
deliberately campaigning against the United States in and from the various combatant
command (CCMD) AORs. Where threats are gray by implication, the environment is
exacting campaign-like effects and threatening U.S. interests in and from those AORs
as well.
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This study also concludes that the
Operational Plans and Military Capabilities
United States is not coherently “campaigning back” in response. AddiFindingstionally, high-level operational micro• CCDR’s presumptive future gray zone remanagement is possibly creating late,
sponsibilities do not align with their curexcessively constrained, and ineffecrent authorities.
tive gray zone responses. 228 Competitors, adversaries, and competitive forc• The current U.S./NATO joint phasing
model is inadequate to seize and maintain
es are operating against U.S. interests
initiative in the gray zone.
now. Effectively securing them will demand that the United States “operate”
• U.S. concepts for the design and operaagainst them as well. A first step in this
tional employment of force and forces is
direction is affording greater latitude
not well-adapted to persistent gray zone
to the CCDRs/GCCs.
competition and conflict
The Unified Command Plan outRecommendationslines CCDR authorities.229 On the surface, it appears that CCDRs have the
• Empower CCDRs to “operate” against active gray zone competition and conflict
requisite authority to operate effectivewith new capabilities and agile, adaptive
ly in the gray zone. The reality is quite
models for campaigning.
different.
High-level U.S. Government dis• Develop and employ new and adaptable
comfort with deliberate operations in
concepts, capabilities, and organizational
the gray zone are byproducts of both
solutions to confront U.S. gray zone challenges.
insufficient senior-level appreciation
of the nature of gray zone challenges,
as well as the asymmetry of risk perceptions outlined previously. This
study concludes that conservative risk tolerance results in excessive caution. It further
concludes that risk aversion and excessive caution are the fruit of inadequate strategic
assessments, insufficient strategic planning, and limited meaningful strategic guidance.
All of these combined are the products of the artificial peace-war dichotomy operative
within the defense enterprise. Together, these ultimately constrain CCMD freedom of
action.
In much of the gray zone, momentum matters. Thus, CCMDs need greater flexibility to adapt to their theater strategic conditions and act to gain and maintain the initiative within their AORs. The team concluded that the CCDRs’ limited ability to act
with due speed and purpose to respond to compelling gray zone threats and shape regional outcomes proactively against them was endemic to the current decision-making
environment.230
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Finding 5: The current U.S./NATO joint phasing model is inadequate to seize and
maintain the initiative in the gray zone.
Purposeful gray zone revisionist actors are successfully campaigning and achieving
warlike objectives inside the steady state or deterrence phases of the U.S./NATO joint
phasing model. These actors define success as operating and gaining physical and political advantage with actions falling just under thresholds that might trigger effective U.S.
and partner responses. Their approach to competition and conflict allow them to make
substantial gains at surprisingly low strategic cost. Likewise, there are transformational
forces afoot in the environment that are breeding complex organic rejectionist threats to
political authority and security. Often these too run counter to core U.S. interests.
The traditional conceptions of peace and war have muddied the waters when it comes
to recognizing emergent threats like these and neatly aligning them with doctrinal joint
planning constructs. None of them, for example, conform to prevailing U.S. defense convention. Embedded in each is the prospect of warlike adversary success in the absence
of what that same convention describes as war, as well as open hostilities arriving via
cold-start and absent traditional indications, warnings, or military preparations. The
latter circumstances might as easily arrive via miscalculation as they could from some
deliberate choice on the part of one or the other of the opposing sides.
The U.S./NATO joint phasing model was designed to confront state militaries employing strictly conventional methods. In each of its manifestations, the study team
found contemporary gray zone challenges to be anything but that. There is no beginning
and end as suggested by the joint phasing construct. Further, purposeful adversaries are
likely “dominating” while the United States and its partners are still “shaping.”231
Instead, the gray zone represents a persistent band of resistance to the U.S.-led status
quo by specific opponents or opposing environmental forces. Action within that band
fluctuates above and below a mean point of constant hostility. The band’s upper limit
is open unambiguous conflict and the lower limit benign competition. Thus, it is reasonable that U.S. military forces operating within it must be prepared to adapt to and
campaign against the unique demands associated with fluctuations above and below the
mean.
The operative U.S. approach to joint campaigning is not consistent with this reality.
The consequences are predictable—slow, disjointed, cautious, often episodic, and largely ineffective reactions versus deliberate, assertive, initiative-gaining campaigns. However, the Joint Staff has correctly identified this as a problem and is currently assessing
existing doctrine—including the campaign plan-phasing construct—with the intent of
updating it to better reflect current reality.232 The extent to which they are able to break
through DoD preferences and achieve real innovation are open questions.
Recommendation: Empower CCDRs to “operate” against active gray zone
competition and conflict with new capabilities and agile and adaptive models for
campaigning.
To effectively buffer at-risk U.S. interests against the unique hazards presented by
gray zone threats, CCDRs should possess the requisite responsibility, authority, and
tools essential to achieve favorable outcomes that are in their purview. This includes
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gaining and maintaining regional initiative against purposeful gray zone competitors,
shaping regional security dynamics to limit those competitors’ freedom of action, and
containing those hazards that prove less immediately controllable. 233
While remaining accountable to senior U.S. decision-makers, CCDRs therefore need
greater freedom of action in contending with the gray zone challenges in their AORs.
This would benefit first from the top-level gray zone playbooks suggested previously.
After all, shared understanding of challenge and response is the natural byproduct of
detailed strategic planning. To the extent the DoD thinks through and designs unique
response options to the various gray zone archetypes, it will be closer to narrowing
the yawning initiative gap that currently separates the United States and its gray zone
competitors. Ultimately, a pre-approved menu of response options for CCDRs would
be ideal.
Currently, the CCDRs’ Theater Campaign Plans describe their vision for achieving
missions assigned in the Unified Command Plan.234 CCMD Theater Security Cooperation Plans outline supporting military-to-military engagements and exercises.235 Finally,
CCMD contingency plans allocate regional military responsibilities in the event of open
crisis or conflict.236 None of these plans address the kind of gray zone campaigning described herein. There are components to all of these in a coherent and focused countergray zone design. Further, as suggested earlier, transition between the activities chartered by each of these might be much more fluid than current systems anticipate.
This study finds the Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning (JCIC) to be a meaningful first step toward a more nimble concept of counter-gray zone operational planning.237 The current approach to campaigning when combined with insufficient understanding of the character of gray zone challenges, significant high-level risk-sensitivity,
and extant CCMD constraints (e.g., authorities, resources, etc.) limit both national-level
and CCMD freedom of action in the gray zone. Fortunately, the JCIC adjusts the DoD’s
current binary peace-war approach to a more fluid model, allowing for more effective
responses to the variance associated with gray zone competition and conflict.
Specific threat-focused gray zone plans of action—coordinated and, to the extent possible, integrated with the interagency—would provide civilian decision-makers a higher
degree of clarity on proposed joint force actions and contingency reactions to competitor
moves or changes in the environment. They could also create more CCDR decision and
operating space to the extent that they include predetermined and approved CCMD
actions vis-à-vis specific gray zone activities. In the case of the latter, the Secretary of
Defense and President would have to accept a higher degree of risk. It would, however,
be known risk with the upside being retention of the initiative and greater control over
strategic outcomes.
This is certainly tricky business for CCMDs. However, persistent competition in this
gray zone band of resistance demands reasonable increases in CCMD latitude.
Enhanced GCC freedom of action is likeliest to emerge from well-coordinated,
risk-informed military plans inextricably linked to a widely socialized set of specific
U.S. objectives. That cannot occur without persistent civil-military interaction and
coordination.
Use of the concept of “global synchronizer” would also allow either the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or more commonly CCDRs, greater freedom to call on
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and target non-military instruments in response to gray zone challenges.238 Developing a strategy or plan to counter or succeed against a specific trans-regional gray zone
challenges (like all of those outlined in the archetypes) would benefit from assigning a
GCC as the global synchronizer and providing them with increased authorities to call on
military and non-military assets outside their direct control.
In short, if the United States chooses to begin operating with military forces against
gray zone threats, it will require greater authority for commanders to act at the operational and theater strategic levels of decision and action. Moreover, it will need new
mechanisms that expedite the process of evaluating options and approving military operations that do not fall neatly on one or the other side of the peace-war divide. Finally, it
will also require high-level interagency agility to assist CCMDs to reinforce and exploit
success, mitigate risk, and contend effectively with strategic surprise and shock.
In the end, military leaders ultimately need to be able to act with greater speed and
purpose and their civilian leadership needs more confidence in their ability to do so
without unnecessarily increasing risk. There will certainly be some increased risk of action; however, to the extent that increased CCMD activity against gray zone challenges
is the product of a strategic design benefiting from extensive advanced civil-military deliberation, the risk incurred will be well-understood and accounted for well in advance.
Finding 6: U.S. concepts for the design and operational employment of force and
forces are not well-adapted to persistent gray zone competition and conflict.
DoD leaders and service chiefs have a responsibility to provide ready forces in the
shape and size required by CCMDs. CCMDs want agile forces that can respond to challenges across the spectrum of military conflict but are also persistently ready to prevail
against purposeful high-end military adversaries. As resources dwindle, the DoD is
challenged to set priorities, build and specify missions for forces, and conduct deliberate operations against any demands other than high-end warfighting and classical
counterterrorism. Suggesting otherwise to the Pentagon is tantamount to advocating for
unacceptably high strategic risk.
Senior defense leaders and strategists have discovered safe harbor in the comfort of
planning for a rising China, a resurgent Russia, a complex Iran, and the most obvious
terrorist elements spinning off Middle Eastern devolution. The first three present prospective military challenges that, under ideal circumstances, conform well to prevailing U.S. defense convention. The latter also falls neatly into the Pentagon’s post-9/11
worldview.
Unfortunately, none of the challenges outlined in this report are operating against
the United States and its interests inside the self-limiting confines of that same Pentagon
convention. The most consequential opponents and opposing environmental forces are
threading military and non-military hybrid approaches and effects together well inside
the United States’ decision-making cycle, crowding out meaningful U.S. responses that
appear always to be a day late and dollar short. The United States has yet to “operate”
against gray zone challenges with purpose, intent, and resolve. Until it does, it cedes a
great deal of ground to capable gray zone actors and important gray zone forces.
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Recommendation: Develop and employ new and adaptable concepts, capabilities,
and organizational solutions to confront U.S. gray zone challenges.
There will be a persistent demand for a variety of operational capabilities and concepts to demonstrate resolve, gain momentum, and create dilemmas for U.S. gray zone
adversaries. At the operational level, this study suggests consideration of a handful of
actions to improve U.S. military performance in this regard. These recommendations
span operational domains, military functions, and service components. Naturally, as
this study originally received its charter from within the U.S. Army, there are several
specific recommendations on U.S. conventional and special operations ground forces.
The DoD could implement all of the aforementioned recommendations, and the United States might still find itself without the tools required to effectively contest gray zone
actors. Therefore, in general, this study finds that joint conventional, special operations,
and functional (e.g., intelligence, cyber, space, etc.) capabilities and enablers will need to
provide greater persistent gray zone utility to policymakers and military leaders. In the
end, CCDRs need credible capabilities (e.g., land, sea, air, space, and cyber), a variety of
innovative posture and employment options, recurring purpose-driven exercises, and
substantial coordinated interagency support to undertake meaningful proactive gray
zone campaigns.
Specific changes in the structure, composition, or equipping of the joint force go beyond the scope of this report. However, in almost every case, the types of forces necessary to prevail in gray zone environments are already in abundant supply. Innovative
organization, better or different preparation, more authorities, new employment concepts, and increased networking and autonomy will make all joint forces better instruments for effective gray zone competition.
GROUND AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES (SOF)
U.S. ground forces are the linchpins in the DoD’s gray zone response. Operations
and operational effects on and from land or projected ashore onto land from the sea
provide a persistent demonstration of U.S. commitment. All U.S. ground forces can
tangibly contribute to contesting gray zone competition with forward-deployed forces
and surge expeditionary capability. In some cases, this may require structural adaptation. However, in most cases, ground force contributions will be most effective when all
forces—Army, Marine, and Special Operations—are more comfortable and demonstrate
the capability to aggregate, disaggregate, and re-aggregate into the most appropriate
and creative mission-tailored force packages.
The Army may consider experimenting with less fixed force structure solutions. For
example, modular brigade combat teams (BCTs) may not be modular enough for the
gray zone. Two common characteristics of gray zone challenges imply new organizational approaches. For example, if all gray zone challenges are hybrids that by definition
menace defense and military convention, they may require equally disruptive hybrid
organizational solutions to compete with them.
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The gray zone may require much different and sometimes much smaller modular
combinations of unique military capabilities. These organizations may have to be more
autonomous, self-sustaining, agile, and multi-functional than current structures imply.
They should be mission-tailored, purpose-built, and certified on a cyclical basis during
each successive readiness cycle.
The U.S. Marine Corps provides one useful model of an agile force structure—the
Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). Often constrained by strategic lift, the Marine
Corps employs adaptable, mission-tailored force packages with inherent ground, air,
and logistical capability to meet GCC requirements. The exact composition and size of
individual units are tailorable, based on mission demands and environmental considerations.
This study found that Army forces would be essential future gray zone contenders.
However, they will need greater flexibility in organizational approaches to do so. Put
directly into the context of this report, one can see how each gray zone archetype may
demand employment of units with very different combinations of combat, combat support, and combat service support capabilities. Thus, all U.S. ground forces—but Army
forces in particular—should ruthlessly pursue new levels of modularity, autonomy, and
self-sufficiency at increasingly lower echelons to make them effective tools for precision
competition in gray zone environments.
This will require ground force leaders to commit to different and sometimes smaller
formations that are more flexible and adaptive. These formations need the ability to
rapidly reconfigure and operate—accepting, integrating, and employing functionally
distinct capabilities without sacrificing readiness or warfighting capability. Finally, as a
principle, ground force leaders should be prepared to lead joint deployable headquarters from brigade to corps level that seamlessly integrate multi-component, combined,
and interagency capabilities to achieve a unique menu of contingency-specific missions.
SOF too will remain important fixtures in U.S. military gray zone responses. Uniquely postured for small footprint, autonomous, and distributed operations in austere
environments, SOF are critical force multipliers under virtually all gray zone conditions. These very characteristics have contributed to SOF being the force of choice under
myriad contingency circumstances.
However, SOF are not panaceas for all strategic problems. Their finite numbers imply new levels of cooperation and integration with general-purpose ground capabilities
in order to maximize their impact. Most SOF-type missions require significant general
purpose force (GPF) assistance. Further, every operation involving the employment of
significant numbers of ground-based GPF involve varying degrees of SOF involvement.
This study suggests that SOF will always feature prominently in U.S. gray zone responses. However, those responses will not succeed without new-levels of SOF-GPF
integration and cooperation, consistent with the concept of modularity discussed earlier. This study argues that GPF will need to become accustomed to conducting SOFlike missions—at times under SOF command and control. Likewise, SOF too will need
increasingly to adapt to routinely operating in direct support and under the command
and control of GPF formations and commanders.
A third area of ground force gray zone emphasis is power projection and entry. As
a general principle, with increasing numbers of U.S. ground forces stationed in and
85

around the continental United States (CONUS), power projection and entry will be critical for credible counter gray zone concepts of operation.
Developing and refining capable joint land forces with inherent early and forcible
entry capabilities that allow for rapid, distributed deployment, and employment under
a variety of circumstances, afford great flexibility to U.S. commanders attempting to design coherent counter-gray campaigns. Uncertainty calls for a greater degree of flexibility than what currently exists. The joint force has begun developing or already possesses
crisis response capabilities in the form of Marine Expeditionary Units, Special Purpose
MAGTFs, and the U.S. Army’s Global Response Force. Building on the modularity discussion, these are necessary but not sufficient for potential future demand.
Joint ground force commanders—but especially the U.S. Army—will benefit from a
thorough reimagining of the potential of expeditionary forces and operations. As it applies to the gray zone, U.S. ground forces need the capability to deploy in large numbers
to perform a wide range of missions: enable and support allies, partners, and sister U.S.
joint forces; build foreign partner capacity; counter adversary unconventional warfare
(UW) campaigns; and perform more traditional offensive and defensive operations (often against hybrid opponents). This requires examining and developing capabilities to
defeat A2AD and rapidly delivering ground capabilities on short notice and limited
advanced planning.
This study found UW to be a final area of unique ground force vulnerability for the
United States and its partners as they assess and contend with gray zone challenges. As
currently defined by American Joint military doctrine, UW is the collection of activities that enable the overthrow of a government through proxy actors in overtly denied
areas.239 U.S. UW vulnerability emerges in both an offensive and defense context. Offensively, UW provides U.S. decision-makers with a baseline capability for covert degradation of an adversary’s control over contested territory. Defensively, Russian and Iranian
UW efforts are currently presenting U.S./partners thorny challenges in Europe and the
Middle East. In both instances, U.S. forces are increasingly unfamiliar with the associated ground force demands that might result.
For example, SOF UW competency has atrophied with the substantial counterinsurgency and counterterrorism demands of the last decade and a half. For their part, GPF
have never been required to understand UW as a concept. Improvement is essential on
both counts.
A sharper offensive UW instrument will be an important tool for pressuring active
gray zone revisionist powers who themselves employ UW to aggressively undermine
U.S. partners. Likewise, deep understanding of UW on the part of GPF forces will enable them to engage in defensive UW activities to generate greater resilience among
the same at risk partners.240 Finally, a more robust ground force UW capability that can
understand, prosecute, and defend against it, employing the widest set of military and
non-military tools, may require a new military competency in “political warfare.”241 This
specific focus would enable both conventional and SOF to grasp the underpinnings and
requirements necessary for prosecuting offensive and defensive UW activities against
sophisticated gray zone actors.
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AIR AND MARITIME CAPABILITIES
To make air and naval forces more capable of responding to gray zone threats, DoD
leaders would be well advised to: improve U.S. overseas basing options, develop more
distributed logistics support, become more joint integrated and self-sustaining, and create a more persistent and capable regional presence. The latter—persistence and presence—does not mean predictable, permanent, or fixed.
Indeed, it is the opposite. All future counter gray zone actions—especially those focused on sophisticated, high-end revisionist threats—should focus on deliberate dislocation of adversary and competitor concepts of operation or courses of action. U.S.
and partner forces should present adversaries with a constantly changing operational
picture against which to pace their forces and plan campaigns. This will allow U.S. and
partner forces to regain the initiative, while forcing competitors to revisit assumptions,
plans, and risk calculations. Doing so ultimately contributes to slowing adversary decision-making and perhaps even lowering risks of escalation or miscalculation.
There is a host of material capabilities that will improve air and naval contributions
to counter gray zone activity. They are largely beyond the scope of this report. However,
the study team does believe in general that any concepts or capabilities that complicate
adversary decision-making and hold at persistent risk high-value competitor assets will
inevitably improve the U.S. position.
CYBER
National-level leadership and CCMDs need to have the ability to influence the cyber
domain in the face of gray zone actors committed to exploiting it. This is especially true
from an A2AD perspective. The United States needs to retain freedom of maneuver in
cyberspace. It must be able to secure U.S. cyber activity while also limiting hostile exploitation of the cyber domain.
The study team believes recent initiatives have the DoD moving in the right direction.
These include the recent recommendation by the Goldwater-Nichols Working Group to
elevate U.S. Cyber Command to a unified CCMD with Title 10/Section 164 authorities.
This includes force provision, advocacy for cyber capabilities, and theater security cooperation.242 Additional authorities and doctrine, organizational adaptation, training, and
leader development/education changes should emerge as the threat landscape becomes
clearer. Any implemented changes should allow for increased U.S. military agility and
tempo in the information environment.
Of particular note in the gray zone is pursuit of “jus extra bellum”—“states’ rights
outside of war”—at the CCMD level. Jus extra bellum is a newly proposed legal paradigm.243 Its adoption may allow for greater U.S. flexibility in operating in the cyber domain against gray zone actors. Patterned after just war theory’s jus ad bellum and jus in
bello, as well as the League of Nation’s Lotus principle, jus extra bellum may provide a
construct for quantifying legal gray zone activity that is essential to the 21st-century
defense of U.S. interests.244 CCDRs should consider building in jus extra bellum authorities into their planning now, based on legal precedence set vis-à-vis cyberspace activities
over the past decade.
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PRECISION EXERCISING AND POWER PROJECTION
The joint force needs to operationalize exercises to support U.S. efforts in the gray
zone. All exercises need to support a deliberate U.S./partner commitment to operate
with purpose against specific gray zone threats. U.S. planners need to place greater emphasis on exercises as tools for affecting competitor decision-making. To date and as
discussed earlier in the report, current U.S. counter-moves in the gray zone appear to
be reactive, episodic, and ineffective (e.g., USS Lassen, USAF B-52 in SCS, and U.S. Navy
Patrol Craft in the Straits of Hormuz).245 This is in large measure attributable to the
asymmetry in U.S.-competitor risk perceptions referenced earlier.246
However, U.S. forces do have a history of conducting adversary-focused exercises
in close proximity to them (e.g., Return of Forces to Germany [REFORGER]). As was
true in the past, routine and recurring military operations today can demonstrate U.S.
resolve in the face of gray zone competitors and competitive forces.247 Further, they can
effectively orient U.S. forces to and prepare them for employment in potential theaters
of active military conflict. They can also increase regional partner interoperability and
capability.
The reality is that flat or decreasing defense resources and expanding challenges
imply new levels of precision in prioritizing and targeting the effects of joint exercises
around the world. If exercises and their effects are recast as operations within a deliberate counter-gray zone campaign, it will become easier for senior defense leaders to
calibrate their purpose and message.
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XII. CONCLUSION—ADAPTATION AND ACTIVISM
As it relates to contemporary gray zone challenges, the United States and its defense enterprise are victims of their own success. The persistent military advantage that
largely secured U.S. global position against all consequential competition since the end
of the Cold War is no longer as secure or relevant as it was over the previous 2 decades.
U.S. interests and global position are materially suffering as a consequence. Without a
more activist and adaptive approach to gray zone challenges, the United States hazards
forfeiture of important interests.
The templates according to which American defense strategists pegged active maintenance of U.S. military dominance since 1991 are fast succumbing to the vagaries of a
turbulent and transformational strategic environment. That environment persistently
favors those who are less beholden to convention. In light of that, an increasingly conservative American superpower finds itself routinely outmaneuvered by those willing
to exploit this trend.
Indeed, purposeful U.S. competitors pursuing meaningful revision of the extant,
American-led international order are employing a host of hybrid methods to advance
and secure interests that are, in many cases, contrary to those of the United States. They
employ unique combinations of influence, intimidation, coercion, and aggression to incrementally crowd out effective resistance, establish local or regional advantage, and
manipulate risk perceptions in their favor. So far, the United States has not come up with
a coherent countervailing approach.
As this is occurring, the exercise of responsible or effective political authority by all
states is increasingly eroding. Rejectionist forces and actors exploit, free-ride on, or are
propelled by this trend to resist any status quo regardless of who leads it. This creates
yet another wicked hybrid security challenge where different combinations of forces
coalesce by chance and spin off violent threats to the United States and its partners.
To date, U.S. strategists fixate on this trend’s indicators—e.g., individual terrorist or
insurgent groups—without recognizing the more important and strategic underlying
condition.
It is important that U.S. defense strategist dispense with an outdated set of strategic
assumptions about the United States, its global position, and the rules that govern the
exercise of contemporary great power. In reality, the U.S. defense enterprise should rely
on three new core assumptions. First, the United States and the U.S.-led status quo will
encounter persistent, unmitigated resistance. Second, resistance will take the form of
gray zone competition and conflict; as a consequence, the gray zone should pace defense strategy, concepts, and capabilities. Finally, the gray zone will confound U.S. defense strategists and institutions until it is normalized and more fully accounted for by
the DoD.
Normalizing and accounting for the DoD’s burgeoning gray zone challenge relies on
it socializing two important concepts—adaptation and activism. The defense enterprise
needs to adapt how it sees its gray zone challenges; how it charters strategic action
against them; and how it designs, prioritizes, and undertakes that strategic action. All
of these require a robust and activist response. Until now, however, the United States
has favored more conservative than progressive approaches to gray zone provocations.
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In short, the forces of revision and rejection are operating effectively by both design
and chance against U.S. interests. Currently, the U.S. defense enterprise is not well positioned conceptually to counter it. U.S. risk in this regard cuts two ways. Action brings
with it prospects of escalation and deeper engagement. Similarly, inaction harbors the
potential for gradual but nonetheless disastrous loss. There are upsides to both as well.
The former benefits from retention of initiative and the latter from husbanding resources
and latitude. This report suggests initiative wins.
Activist U.S. defense responses to gray zone challenges will not be without cost or
complication. Thus, prudence and pragmatism should guide future risk-based choices.
However, Theodore Roosevelt’s counsel—cited earlier in this report—is indispensable
here: “In any moment of decision, the best thing you can do is the right thing, the next
best thing is the wrong thing, and the worst thing you can do is nothing.”
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